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A NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER FOR IMPROVING FEDERAL
REGULATION? DEEPER AND WIDER
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
ROBERT W. HAHN' & CASS R. SUNSTEINft
For over two decades, federal agencies have been required to analyze the
benefits and costs of signicant regulatory actions and to show that the benefits
justify the costs. But the regulatory state continues to suffer from significant
problems, including poor priority-setting, unintended adverse side-effects, and,
on occasion, high costs for low benefits. In many cases, agencies do not offer an
adequate account of either costs or benefits, and hence the commitment to cost-
benefit balancing is not implemented in practice. A major current task is to en-
sure a deeper and wider commitment to cost-benefit analysis, properly under-
stood. We explain how this task might be accomplished and offer a proposed
executive order that would move regulation in better directions. In the course of
the discussion, we explore a number of pertinent issues, including the actual
record of the last two decades, the precautionary principle, the value of "prompt
letters," the role of distributionalfactors, and the need to incorporate independ-
ent agencies within the system of cost-benefit balancing.
INTRODUCTION
A. Processes and Problems
For over twenty years, the executive branch of the federal gov-
ernment has required regulatory agencies to assess the costs and bene-
fits of regulation, and to attempt to ensure that the benefits outweigh,
or justify, the costs.1 At least in a formal sense, cost-benefit balancing
is now the official creed of the executive branch, as demonstrated by a
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I President Reagan first issued an executive order requiring agencies to use cost-
benefit analysis. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
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series of executive orders.2 The point cuts across partisan divisions:
President Clinton's approach differed somewhat from President
Reagan's, but it shared the fundamental commitment to cost-benefit
balancing.
Notwithstanding this public commitment, national regulation has
hardly come into compliance with the principles of cost-benefit bal-
ancing.4 This overall pattern of imperfect compliance should raise
many alarm bells, even for those who have real doubts about cost-
benefit analysis and merely want more coherence and better priority-
setting. The general record does show numerous successes, in the
form of regulations that promise to deliver significant benefits at a
relatively low price.* But in many cases, regulations seem to do more
harm than good.6 Indeed, a close look at federal regulatory policy
shows a wide range of problems. Perhaps foremost among them is ex-
ceptionally poor priority-setting, with substantial resources sometimes
going to small problems, and with little attention being paid to some
serious problems.7 There are also unnecessarily high costs, with $146
2 See id. (requiring regulations to pass a cost-benefit test); see also Exec. Order No.
12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986) (requiring agencies to submit an annual regulatory plan
and to adhere to cost-benefit principles); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994)
(requiring agencies to assess all costs and benefits of regulatory alternatives).
President Clinton's order expressly required agencies to consider distributive
impacts and equity, and also to pay attention to qualitative as well as quantitative fac-
tors, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), whereas President Reagan's
approach did none of these things, Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982).
4 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analysis: The Failure of Agen-
cies to Comply with Executive Order 1Z866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859, 861 (2000)
(suggesting that the absence of information on net benefits in a majority of regulatory
impact analyses examined leads to the conclusion that the agencies involved have
failed to carry out cost-benefit analyses); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-
Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1137, 1182-86
(2001) (showing inefficiency under cost-benefit orders).
5 See ROBERT W. HAHN ET AL., Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? 15-
19 (2000) (evaluating twenty-four regulations whose mortality benefits constitute
ninety percent of total benefits and concluding that nine pass a cost-benefit test be-
cause their net cost per statistical life saved is less than $5 million), available at
http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/books/hlv.pdf; Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-
Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1661 (2001) (providing examples
where "[c]ost-benefit analysis has.., led to regulations that accomplish statutory goals
at lower cost or that do not devote limited private and public resources to areas where
they are unlikely to do much good").
6 See HAHN ET AL., supra note 5, at 19 (finding that over half of the twenty-four
regulations studied were likely to cause an increase in mortality risk).
7 This is the theme of STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOwARD
EFFEcTrIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
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to $229 billion being attributable to compliance costs each year.'
We do not contend that an assessment of quantified costs and
quantified benefits tells us everything that we need to know or that
precise numbers are always possible. 9 But when the costs are high and
the benefits low or nonexistent, something seems seriously amiss, es-
pecially because an absence of significant benefits signals a likely ab-
sence of significant savings in terms of health, safety, or the environ-
ment. Especially in a period in which economic growth and improved
safety and health are among government's highest priorities, this is a
major problem. And indeed, the recent reports of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB), designed to capture the costs and bene-
fits of a wide range of regulations, reveal some disturbing numbers:
the EPA's regulation for financial assurance for municipal solid waste
landfills has monetized benefits of $0, but costs of $100 million, and
this is expected for the next thirteen years;' ° for the next thirteen
years, the Department of Labor's methylene chloride regulation will
have annual costs of $100 million and annual benefits of $40 million;"
the cost-benefit ratio for airbag depowering regulation seems bad,
though there is uncertainty in the data.
1 2
Consider Table 1, which lists some estimates of costs and benefits
of recent regulations:
8 Unless otherwise noted, year dollars are taken from the source that is cited. In
this case, the OMB estimates that the cost of social regulation as of 1999 is between
$146 and $229 billion in 1996 dollars. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. &
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL
REGULATIONS, at tbl.4 (2000) [hereinafter OMB 2000 REPORT CHARTS],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/2000fedreg-charts.pdf. In an earlier report
to Congress, the OMB noted that the EPA's 1990 Cost of Clean report estimated the cost
of environmental regulations as of 1988 to be $101 billion (1996 dollars). The OMB
used this figure as a baseline and added the cost of all major environmental regula-
tions issued by the EPA and certain other agencies between 1987 and 1996 to estimate
the annual cost of environmental regulation in 1997 at $144 billion (1996 dollars).
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE COST AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATION, at tbl.1 (1997),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/chap2.html.
9 See KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL,
HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION 8 (1996) (recommending that analysts "give due
consideration to factors that defy quantification but are thought to be important"),
http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/books/benefit-cost analysis.pdf, LISA
HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKERMAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 14 (2002) (emphasizing that "Numbers Don't Tell Us
Every0thing").
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Table 1: Questionable Cost-Benefit Ratios
13
(Net Benefits of Regulations in millions, adjusted to 1996 dollars)
Regtlation 2000 2005 2010 2015
Exposure to -60 -60 -60 -60
Methylene Chloride
Roadway Worker 0 0 0 0
Protection
Financial Assurance -100 -100 -100 -100
for Municipal Solid
Waste Landfills
Pulp and Paper -150 to 0 -150 to 0 -150 to 0 -150 to 0
Effluent Guidelines
National Ambient Air 0 -235 to 240 -840 to 1190 -9200 to
Quality Standards: -1000
Ozone
Child Restraint -40 to 40 -40 to 40 -40 to 40 -40 to 40
Anchorage Systems/
Child Restraint System
Vessel Response Plans -220 -220 -220 -220
Nitrogen Oxide Emis- -57 to 29 -57 to 29 -57 to 29 -57 to 29
sion from New Fossil
Fuel Fired Steam
Generating Units
It might seem that existing executive orders would prevent or re-
duce outcomes of this kind, but apparently these orders have not had
a large effect.14 Indeed, there is some evidence that the existing or-
13 See OMB 2000 REPORT CHARTS, supra note 8, at tbls.1 1-14 (providing the data to
support this Table). For an analysis that applies a strict cost-benefit test to forty-eight
nontransfer rules promulgated under the OMB between April 1, 1995, and March 31,
1999, and that reports the percentage of rules that fail the test under best-case, most-
likely, and worst-case estimate scenarios, see ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT E. LITAN, AN
ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD GOVERNMENT REPORT ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS, at tbls.1-2 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies,
Regulatory Analysis No. 00-1, 2000), http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/
reganalyses/reg-analysis_00_01 .pdf.
14 See HAHN & LITAN, supra note 13, at 5 (suggesting "that agencies have generally
failed to comply with President Clinton's Executive Order 12,866 and the related OMB
guidelines on benefit-cost analysis"). Another study suggests that more than half of the
government's final regulations do not pass a cost-benefit test. ROBERT W. HAHN,
REGULATORY REFORM: ASSESSING THE GOVERNMENT'S NUMBERS (AEI-Brookings Joint
Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 99-6, 1999), http://
www.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/working_9906.pdf; see also HAHN &
LITAN, supra note 13, at tbl.1 (showing that a significant number of recent regulations
would fail a strict cost-benefit test).
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ders have had little impact on what agencies actually do.
5
This is no mere academic objection. Expensive regulation may
well increase prices, reduce wages, and increase unemployment (and
hence poverty)."' Resources now being devoted to small or imaginary
problems might be diverted instead to areas where, by all accounts,
they could produce far more good. Cost-benefit analysis is not an ef-
fort to reduce all human goods to numbers, but to increase the likeli-
hood that regulation will actually produce human goods. Precise
numbers do not exist, but according to a suggestive study, better allo-
cations of health expenditures could save, each year, 60,200 additional
lives at no additional cost-and such allocations could maintain the
current level of lives saved with $31.1 billion in annual savings.17 We
do not believe that cost-benefit analysis should be the exclusive basis
for assessing regulation, but we do believe that it is an important tool,
and that a movement toward improved balancing is likely to promote
many social goals, including better health and increased longevity.'8
This somewhat abstract claim has been dramatized by repeated dem-
onstrations that some regulations create significant substitute risks' 9-
and that with cheaper, more effective tools, regulation could achieve
its basic goals while saving billions of dollars. 0
15 See Posner, supra note 4, at 1181 fig.7 (showing costs per life saved before and
after 1981). For an examination of the impact of the efficiency effects of executive su-
pervision on regulation, see SCorr FARROW, EVALUATING THE REGULATORY PROCESS
AND GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE: DOES EXECUTIVE OFFICE OVERSIGHT MATTER? (Ctr.
for the Study & Improvement of Regulation, Carnegie Mellon Univ. Discussion Paper,
1999), http://www.epp.cmu.edu/csir. Farrow finds that executive office oversight
"appears to have no significant efficiency-improving impact on the difference between
proposed and final regulations and on the cost effectiveness of regulation." Id. at 2. A
partial reason is that some statutes forbid cost-benefit balancing, but we believe that
this is not the whole picture.
16 To offer a few more details: If regulation increases marginal costs for firms, it is
certain to lead to higher prices; if regulation increases a firm's labor costs, wages will
be reduced; but it is less clear whether regulation will increase unemployment, at least
in the long run. If the regulation increases the cost of capital relative to labor, em-
ploy7ent might even increase.
Tammy 0. Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social
Investments in Life-Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED 167, 172-73 (Robert W.
Hahn ed., 1996).
18 See HAHN ET AL., supra note 5, at 24 (suggesting that evaluating the mortality
implications of regulatory costs is a useful complement to cost-benefit analysis).
19 See RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham &Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (containing case
studies demonstrating that risk substitution exists).
20 See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID
RAIN PROGRAM 315 (2000) (stating that the emissions-trading program "can both
2002] 1493
1494 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 150:1489
B. A Deeper and Wider Commitment to Cost-Benefit Analysis
How can regulation be moved in more sensible directions? This is
a large question, and we will not attempt to answer it thoroughly here.
But it seems to us that much of the answer lies in improved institu-
tions, and, in particular, in institutional reforms that increase the role
of cost-benefit analysis in regulatory policy as a way of drawing atten-
tion to the likely effects of alternative courses of action. Of course,
statutory changes would be necessary in many cases. We emphasize
two points here. First, the commitment to cost-benefit analysis has
been far too superficial, and in some ways mostly symbolic; it should
be deepened through efforts to strengthen its actual role. Second, the
commitment to cost-benefit analysis has been far too narrow; it should
be widened through efforts to incorporate independent regulatory
commissions within its reach.
In this Article, we propose and explore a modest but potentially
significant step toward greater depth and width: a new executive or-
der on federal regulation, building on lessons derived from the expe-
rience of the last two decades. The proposed order, designed to re-
place or reform the current one, offers eight basic innovations over
existing practice. Most of these address the issue of depth; the last
point goes to the issue of width.
1. Promoting Compliance. Our proposal attempts to ensure that
agencies will actually comply with the basic principles established in
previous orders, in part by explicitly requiring agency compliance with
OMB guidelines for regulatory analysis. This would be an extremely
significant step, because OMB's guidelines have been widely ignored,2'
and because compliance with those guidelines would significantly in-
crease rationality and coherence in the regulatory process.
2. "Prompting" Regulation. Our proposed order strenghthens the
role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) and
explicitly creates a mechanism by which OIRA might "prompt" regula-
tion as well as constrain it. OIRA has issued a series of prompt letters
achieve stated environmental objectives and reduce compliance costs"); Robert N. Sta-
vins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 31, 35-41 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2d ed. 2000) (dem-
onstrating that tradeable permit programs can achieve environmental goals and save
money).
21 See Hahn et al., supra note 4, at 861 (concluding that agencies have ignored
OMB guidelines from the fact that RIAs "do not provide enough information to enable




under President Bush. This is an important way to ensure that cost-
benefit analysis will be used not simply to reduce and limit regulation,
but also to spur regulation in those cases where it will do more good
than harm.2 3 By creating a mechanism for prompting regulation, our
order moves cost-benefit analysis in the direction of service as a tech-
nical tool for improving regulation, rather than simply being a
mechanism for reducing it.
3. Considering Substitute Risks and Not Regulating Trivial Problems.
We include explicit requirements that, to the extent permitted by law,
agencies (a) consider the substitute risks introduced by regulation and
(b) do not attempt to regulate trivial or de minimis problems. These
requirements build on some important developments within the fed-
eral courts, which have created default rules authorizing agencies to
consider substitute risks and to make de minimis exceptions to regula-tory " 24
tory requirements. These default rules are mirrored in federal legis-
lation, which often bars regulation of trivial risks,2 5 and which also
calls, in many places, for attention to substitute risks.26
4. Explaining Rationales for Action When Benefits Do Not Exceed Costs.
We require that benefits should generally be expected to exceed costs,
and ask agencies to provide a rationale for proceeding with any regu-
lation that fails to pass a cost-benefit test (based on best quantifiable
estimates).27 Some statutes explicitly require agencies to act even if
22 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROMPT LETTERS, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/
inforeg/promptjletter.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2002).
23 Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, More Good than Harm: A First Principle
for EnvironmentalAgencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379 (1993).
24 See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 1668, 1673 (arguing that "the D.C. Circuit has de-
veloped a principle authorizing agencies to make de minimis exceptions to regulatory
requirements," and that "[r]ecent cases suggest... a strong presumption in favor of
permitting (and even requiring) agencies to take account of substitute risks").
25 This is the prevailing interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, under both the toxic substance provisions and the more general provisions of
the Act. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639 (1980)
("[T]he Act... requires the Secretary, before issuing any standard, to determine that
it is reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material
health impairment."); Int'l Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (affirm-
ing the position that the Act requires OSHA, "once it has identified a 'significant'
safet risk, to enact a safety standard").
See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1994) (requiring EPA to take account of "nonair
quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements").
27 For a related view, see ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., AN AGENDA FOR FEDERAL
REGULATORY REFORM (1997). The authors recommend that Congress require all regu-
latory agencies to report the quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits of regulations.
Id. at 13. In addition, the authors argue that "Congress should require that all new
regulations costing more than $100 million annually pass a broadly defined benefit-
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the benefits fall short of the costs. 2s There may also be cases in which
an agency believes that it is worthwhile to proceed even though the
quantifiable benefits do not exceed the quantifiable costs. Either way,
we believe that accountability and transparency would be enhanced if
the head of an agency were required to explain why a regulation is be-
ing adopted.
5. Making Underlying Analysis Available. For each significant regu-
latory action, we ask the appropriate agency to include an underlying
analysis of the benefits and costs, so that interested parties inside and
outside of the government can understand how the results were ob-
tained, and perform their own analysis of the issue if they so choose.
We believe that this requirement will also promote transparency and
enhance accountability.
6. Formulating Regulatory Retrospective and Plan. We require each
agency to create an annual regulatory retrospective and an annual
regulatory plan. The retrospective should contain a general analysis
of the costs and benefits of significant regulations; this analysis will fa-
cilitate OMB's statutory task of compiling an annual account for the
executive branch as a whole. ' The annual regulatory plan, following a
similar requirement in the existing executive order,3 ° would contain
an account of what the agency aspires to do in the following year. The
purpose of the regulatory plan is to ensure early, rather than last-
minute, OIRA involvement in planning, and also to promote the in-
volvement of high-level agency staff at an early stage.
7. Incorporating Independent Agencies. For the first time, we include
the independent regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC),
and Federal Communications Commission (FCC), within the ambit of
the order. This is a significant departure from existing practice. We
believe that the innovation is justified because these agencies are en-
gaged in important regulatory functions. The inclusion of independ-
ent agencies raises obvious legal issues, which we discuss below.3'
cost test." Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (1994) (requiring national primary air quality stan-
dards that, with "an adequate margin of safety," are "requisite to protect the public
health").
20 This task is required by the Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-58, § 628 (a), 113 Stat. 472,472-73 (1999).
30 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994) (describing the regulatory plan
requirement).
31 See infra Part 1I.G (discussing the problems of statutory interpretation but noting
that the Department ofJustice and the American Bar Association agree that incorpora-
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8. Authorizing Judicial Review. We provide for limited judicial re-
view of the documents and materials generated as a result of the or-
der. The goal of this provision is to increase the likelihood that agen-
cies will take the order's requirements seriously. It also authorizes the
invalidation of arbitrary and capricious agency action, to the extent
that the relevant materials are pertinent, as a matter of law, in a test of
the legality of agency conduct.
We believe that a new executive order is probably the best way to
move in the directions suggested by these ideas. There are, however,
reasonable counterarguments. For well over a year, the Bush admini-
stration has been operating under an executive order issued by Presi-
dent Clinton, and there are real virtues in a situation in which regula-
tory oversight under a president from one party is done under a set of
principles issued by another. It is important to give such oversight
both the reality and the appearance of nonpartisanship. A possible
approach would be to retain the Clinton order and to issue a supple-
mental order that embodies some of the proposals described here. In
any case, many of the ideas in this Article might be promoted without
a new order. Greater depth, for example, might well be achieved sim-
ply by a stronger effort, by OIRA, to ensure compliance with existing
requirements32 and, indeed, by an insistence on many of the proposals
made here." If a new executive order were not to be issued, consider-
able progress might well be made with these suggestions in mind. For
those who lack enthusiasm for our recommendations, we hope that
the discussion will nonetheless cast light on the actual performance of
the federal government after twenty years of experience under a
(nominal) commitment to cost-benefit analysis. Indeed, some critics
tion of the independent agencies would be lawful).
32 SeeJohn D. Graham, Executive Regulatory Review: Surveying the Record, Mak-
ing It Work, Address Before the Weidenbaum Center Forum (Dec. 17, 2001), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/graham-speechl2l
70 1 .html ("The changes
we are making at OMB are not headline-grabbers: No far-reaching legislative initia-
tives, no rhetoric-laden executive orders, and no campaigns of regulatory relief. Yet we
are making some changes that we believe will have a long-lasting impact on the regula-
tory state.").
33 Of course, it would not be possible to incorporate the independent regulatory
commissions under the process of OIRA review without a new executive order.
34 We do not deal here with a pervasive problem: OIRA has a small staff (about
fifty) and many regulations to review (about 600 are deemed significant each year). To
produce the improvements that we think desirable, OIRA's staff would obviously need
to be large enough to do the necessary work, and adequate funds would have to be
provided to do analyses. For an assessment of the amount spent on evaluating regula-
tions as a percentage of the overall cost of regulations, see ROBERT W. HAHN &, ROBERT
E. LITAN, IMPROVING REGULATORY AccoUNTABILrIY 26 n.29 (1997), http://www.aei-
14972002]
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will be pleased to see the modest effects of cost-benefit requirements
to date.35
This Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly outlines the de-
velopment of executive orders on federal regulation. At the same
time, it provides an account of what we mean by the still-controversial
idea of cost-benefit balancing, and an exploration of the lessons from
two decades of experience with executive orders on federal regula-
tion. We emphasize here the extent to which the commitment to cost-
benefit analysis has been, too much of the time, symbolic rather than
real. Part II explains and defends our innovations. Part III explores
the limits of reform via executive order, and offers an account of what
else might be done. Following a brief conclusion, the Appendix con-
tains the text of our proposed executive order.
I. CLARIFICATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
A. What Is Cost-Benefit Analysis?
Before proceeding to the details, it is important to clarify our basic
understanding of cost-benefit analysis. We mean to use the term in a
modest, nonsectarian way, seeing cost-benefit analysis as a tool and a
procedure, rather than as a rigid formula to govern outcomes. Thus
understood, cost-benefit analysis requires a full accounting of the con-
sequences of an action, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Of-
ficials should have this accounting before them when they make deci-
sions.
We do not insist that regulators should be bound by the "bottom-
line" numbers; qualitative considerations, and a sense of distributive
impacts (not themselves considered "benefits" in the analysis), are
permitted to influence public officials. But if regulators are to pro-
ceed, they should be prepared to explain either how the benefits ex-
ceed the costs, or if they do not, why it is nonetheless worthwhile to go
forward. When the benefits do not exceed the costs, it would make
sense to adopt a presumption against proceeding-a presumption
brookings.org/publications/books/improving-reg-accountability.pdf.
35 See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 1 ("In fact, cost-benefit analysis is
inca,able of delivering what it promises.").
See ARROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 3 ("Benefit-cost analysis should play an impor-
tant role in informing the decisionmaking process .. " (emphasis added)); Matthew D.
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29
J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1106 (2000) ("CBA is properly conceptualized as a welfarist deci-
sion procedure... " (emphasis added)).
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that might be rebutted by showing, for example, that children would
be the principal beneficiaries of the regulation, or that poor people
would be disproportionately benefited. We therefore understand cost-
benefit analysis to require a certain procedure: A quantitative and
qualitative accounting of the effects of regulation, together with a duty
to explain the grounds for action unless the benefits exceed the costs.
On this view, the antonym to regulation guided by cost-benefit analysis
is regulation undertaken without anything like a clear sense of the
likely consequences-or regulation that amounts to a stab in the
dark .
What are the arguments for cost-benefit analysis, so understood?
We do not attempt to answer this question in detail;3 but it is impor-
tant to see the central points. The standard response is economic in
character: Regulation should ordinarily promote social welfare, and
while social welfare might be promoted by regulations that fail cost-
benefit analysis,39 cost-benefit analysis is an imperfect but useful and
administrable proxy for the inquiry into the social welfare question.
At the very least, it seems clear that regulation is unlikely to promote
social welfare when its costs are very high and its benefits are very
low--especially when we consider the fact that high costs are likely to
be translated into some combination of higher prices, lower wages,
and lower returns to capital. It is not necessary to think that govern-
ment should be treated as some maximizing machine in order to con-
clude that officials should know the consequences of regulation be-
fore they act, and that they should be reluctant to issue regulations
that promise to cost much and to deliver little.
Of course, it is possible that in practice, quantitative cost-benefit
analysis will have excessive influence on government decisions, drown-
37 We are assuming throughout that regulators are acting in a situation of risk
(where probabilities can be assigned to various outcomes) rather than uncertainty
(where no such probabilities can be assigned). In a situation of uncertainty, when ex-
isting knowledge does not permit regulators to assign probabilities to outcomes, it is
exceedingly hard to do cost-benefit analysis. In such circumstances, other decision
rules may be useful, such as the maximin principle (choose the policy with the best
worst-case outcome). See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE 185-207
(1983) for a helpful discussion.
38 For a discussion of the value of cost-benefit analysis, see ARROW ET AL., supra
note 9, at 3-6; and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (forthcoming 2002) (manu-
script at 58-82, 395-403, on file with author).
39 See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 245-46 (1999) (stating that "[m]aximizing overall well-being is an important
role of the government" and providing examples of situations where the outcome of
cost-benefit analysis should be disregarded in favor of welfarist considerations).
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ing out "soft variables." 40 Since the numbers are not all that matters,
any such effect would be a point against cost-benefit analysis. But to
date, the actual record does not support this concern. To take just
one example, the EPA's decision to go forward with new controls on
arsenic in drinking water was supported partly on the ground that
nonquantifiable variables tipped the balance.4' We will suggest that in
appropriate cases, distributional considerations should also count.
The risk that cost-benefit analysis will drown out relevant variables is
not a reason to abandon the analysis, but to take steps to ensure
against any such effect.
It is useful to compare cost-benefit analysis with the "precautionary
principle," often invoked as a foundation for risk regulation and in-
deed as an alternative to cost-benefit analysis.42 The precautionary
principle asks government to prevent risks, even if they are quite
speculative, on the ground that it is important to guard against large
problems even if they might not come to fruition. Of course it is
worthwhile to take some precautions against serious risks, even if the
probability of their occurrence is well under 100%. We think, how-
ever, that the precautionary principle is an inadequate guide to ac-
40 See Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air and the Constitution, 20 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 121, 149 (2001) ("[C]ost-benefit analysis tends to underrate those things that
cannot be so quantified and monetized."); Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About
Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1318-19 & n.25
(1974) (arguing that the use of 'objective' quantitative analysis may result in the
"squeezing out [of] 'soft' but crucial information merely because it seems difficult to
render commensurable with the 'hard' data in the problem").
41 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2002)
(manuscript at 22, on file with author), for an argument that the EPA was aware of the
fact that the monetized costs were greater than the monetized benefits but,
"[n]onetheless, it concluded that once the nonquantified benefits... were included,
the costs would be well justified."
42 See generally RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (Julian Morris
ed., 2000). Some suggested alternatives to cost-benefit analysis are nothing of the kind.
For example, Lisa Heinzerling and Frank Ackerman discuss technology-based regula-
tion and pollution trading as preferable alternatives. HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra
note 9, at 31. But cost-benefit analysis is not an alternative to technolog-based regula-
tion; it is a tool for assessing what kind of regulation makes best sense. Similarly, cost-
benefit analysis assists in evaluating pollution trading-a low-cost method of bringing
about compliance with regulatory goals. In any trading system it is necessary to "cap"
overall emissions, and cost-benefit analysis is a way of helping to decide on the most
sensible cap. Heinzerling and Ackerman are right to say that "[miany regulatory pro-
grams have been a terrific success without using cost-benefit analysis to set pollution
limits." Id. at 32. As we have suggested, cost-benefit analysis helps to identify the suc-
cesses. Our claim is that we could have more successes, better successes, and fewer
failures if we attempted to analyze the consequences first.
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tion, simply because dangers often lie on both sides of the equation.
Consider the case of genetic modification of food, a process that does
carry some risks: A failure to allow genetic modification might well re-
sult in many deaths, and a small probability of many more, simply be-
cause genetic modification might well deliver cheaper and healthier
food.4 Doesn't the precautionary principle require genetic modifica-
tion of food at the same time that it prohibits it?
Or consider the question whether to ban the use of DDT. The
precautionary principle might well seem to require the ban, because
DDT imposes health risks for birds and mammals, including human
beings. But the ban itself seems to be banned by the principle, be-
cause any such ban might lead to either unsafe or more expensive
substitutes, and in either case the ban creates a (speculative) risk of
serious harms.45 Or consider an effort to introduce stringent regula-
tion of arsenic in drinking water. It is possible tojustify the regulation
on the ground that low levels of arsenic might create substantial risks;
but it is also possible to complain that the expensive regulation (cost-
ing, say, $200 million) itself creates a risk of mortality effects, a risk
that would be forbidden by the precautionary principle. What should
government do?
The precautionary principle, taken for all that it is worth, is fre-
quently paralyzing: It stands as an obstacle to regulation and to non-
regulation, and to everything in between. Of course speculative harms
often deserve attention. But we think that too much of the time, the
precautionary principle is merely a combination of rhetoric and myo-
pia, having force only when people look at an essentially arbitrary part
of the picture, rather than at the whole. A competent cost-benefit
analysis takes good account of what is sensible in the precautionary
principle, by asking regulators to attend to low-probability risks of sig-
nificant harms. Cost-benefit analysis subsumes this risk, as it does all
43 See JONATHAN B. WIENER, PRECAUTION IN A MULTI-RISK WORLD 1 (Duke Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series, Working Paper No. 23, 2001) ("[Plrecaution
against one risk may induce other countervailing risks, so that the ideal is a middle
ground of 'optimal precaution' rather than maximum protection."),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=293859.
Indur M. Goklany, Applying the Precautionay Principle in a Broader Context, in
RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 42, at 189, 219
("[L]imiting [genetically modified] crops will almost certainly increase hunger and
malnutrition because that would reduce the quantity and quality of food which would
otherwise be produced.").
45 See id. at 190-92 (describing the potential increase in the incidence of malaria
and the possible inadequacy of alternatives to DDT).
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others, into the overall assessment of welfare effects of regulation 6
Indeed, the most sensible understandings of the precautionary princi-
ple emphasize the need for an overall assessment, and insist on ex-
ploring all of the risks at stake, including low-probability, potentially
catastrophic risks.47
A less familiar argument for cost-benefit analysis, growing out of
our doubts about the precautionary principle, is cognitive in charac-
ter. One goal of cost-benefit analysis is to overcome cognitive limita-
tions by ensuring that people have a full, rather than limited, sense of
what is at stake. 8 People often miss the systemic effects of risk regula-ti 49
non; cost-benefit analysis is a way of putting those effects squarely on-
screen. At the same time, cost-benefit analysis helps overcome the
problems created by cognitive heuristics that can lead people to mis-
understand the magnitude of risks, by allowing an accounting of the
actual consequences of current hazards and of the effects of reducing
them.50 To the extent that people's emotions are getting the better of
them, by producing massive concern about small risks,5 cost-benefit
analysis should help put things in perspective, and at the same time
might help to calm popular fears. And if people are indifferent to a
risk that is actually quite large, cost-benefit analysis will help to stir
them out of their torpor. The result should be to help with cognitive
distortions and to produce sensible priority-setting.
There are democratic advantages as well.5 Interest groups often
46 Obviously, it is impossible to take extra caution (or spend more) on all activities,
simply because there is a finite budget constraint at any point in time. For a good
overview of the precautionary principle, see John D. Graham, Decision-Analytic Refine-
ments of the Precautionary Principle, 4J. RISK RES. 127 (2001).
See Goklany, supra note 44, at 189-90 (proposing a framework for ranking threats
based on factors including degrees of risk and certainty).
48 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 38 (manuscript at 53, 52-82) ("I suggest that cost-
benefit analysis is best defended as a means of overcoming predictable problems in in-
dividual and social cognition .... [and should] be understood as a method for putting
,on screen' important social facts that might otherwise escape private and public atten-
tion.").
49 See DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE 1-10 (Rita Kimber & Robert Kim-
ber trans., 1996) (introducing ways in which people discount risk and the potential
negative consequences that follow).
50 See Roger G. Noll &James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 762 (1990) (describing how these "pathologies" can
affect estimates of risk).
51 See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 269
(2001) (explaining that emotional responses diverge from cognitive evaluations of risk,
despite the fact that people are aware that the risks are small).
52 Cf Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
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manipulate policy in their preferred directions, sometimes by exag-
gerating risks, sometimes by minimizing them, and sometimes by mo-
bilizing public sentiment in their preferred directions. An effort to
produce a fair accounting of actual dangers should help to diminish
the danger of interest-group manipulation. More generally, cost-
benefit analysis should increase the likelihood that citizens generally,
and officials in particular, will be informed of what is actually at stake.
By itself, this is a large democratic gain.
Of course, interest groups will also try to manipulate the numbers
in their preferred directions. Industry will tend to exaggerate the
costs and minimize the risks. Public interest groups will do the oppo-
site. A government that attempts to produce cost-benefit analysis will
face a formidable task; it is possible that government will lack the in-
formation necessary to do this task well. But if there is a degree of ac-
curacy, and if ranges are specified where there is uncertainty, cost-
benefit analysis can be seen, not as some antidemocratic effort to tyr-
annize people with numbers, but instead as an indispensable tool of
democratic self-government.
We can go further. Prospective estimates of both costs and bene-
fits often turn out to be wrong.3 This is not merely because of inter-
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 171, 172-75, 178-90 (1988)
(suggesting some democratic virtues of economic incentives).
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, 1998 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 40-43 (1999) (reviewing examples of agency cost
and benefit estimates that were later determined to be inaccurate), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreportl998.pdf. A table contains an
illuminating summary:
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est-group pressures. One reason is that officials lack the extensive in-
formation that would permit them to make accurate predictions; in-
deed, the informational demand on agencies is overwhelming, espe-
cially because technologies change over time.5 4 An enduring problem
for regulatory policy is the absence of precise information on the cost
or benefit sides. This point should be taken, not as a criticism of cost-
benefit analysis as such, but as a reason for continuous monitoring
and updating. 5  Our emphasis on retrospective analysis and on
prompt letters is intended to take account of the frequent inadequacy
of prospective estimates.
There are numerous challenges to cost-benefit analysis as a regula-
tory tool. 56 We cannot discuss those challenges in this space. We sus-
pect that many of them are rooted, at bottom, in pragmatic considera-
tions-in a belief that in practice, cost-benefit analysis will be used as
an obstacle to desirable regulation. According to some skeptics, the
Estimated Costs and Benefits of OSHA Rules: Prospective vs. Retrospective
Regulation Year Estimated Costs Estimated Benefits
Issued
Vinyl Chloride 1974 Overestimated by a factor Not clear
of four
Cotton Dust 1978 Overestimated by a factor Overestimated by more than a factor of
of three two
Lead (Secon- 1978 Capital costs significantly Overestimated the importance of engi-
dary Smelters) underestimated neering controls in achieving benefits
Ethylene Oxide 1984 About right Not clear
(Hospitals)
Formaldehyde 1987 Over by a factor of two Not clear
(Metal (although costs of engi-
Foundries) neering controls consid-
erably underestimated)
Grain 1987 Not clear Not clear
Handling
PSDI Power 1988 Underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, or both
Presses
Powered 1989 Underestimated costs, overestimated benefits, or both
Platforms
Id. at 41 (footnotes omitted).
54 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Gov-
ernment's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manu-
script at 15-18, on file with author).
See id. (manuscript at 38-41) (urging a reform of NEPA that would call for care-
ful attention to new information over time).
See HEINZERLING & ACKERMAN, supra note 9, at 11-30 (reviewing the "fundamen-
tal flaws" and "practical problems" of cost-benefit analysis); Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatoiy
Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE LJ. 1981, 2042-64 (1998) (noting that an assess-
ment of the cost-effectiveness of regulating risk is dependent on subjective evaluations
of the future benefit, risk assessment, and regulatory purpose).
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antonym of cost-benefit analysis is not the unguided stab in the dark,
but regulatory protection itself. If this were so, the argument for cost-
benefit analysis would be greatly weakened. But the evidence does not
support this pessimistic prediction; 57 indeed, cost-benefit analysis has
helped to spur regulation, not merely to stop it. We believe that, in
principle, cost-benefit analysis has a great deal of promise, and that
when it has been used, it has often made things better rather than
worse."' Of course, the case for cost-benefit analysis will depend, in
large part, on what people do with it in the future.
B. History
Since 1980, all three branches of American government have
shown increased interest in cost-benefit balancing." Our emphasis
here is on the actions of the executive branch, which has had a long-
standing interest in cost-benefit balancing, an interest that cuts across
partisan divisionsi' A brief historical review will set the stage.
President Nixon inaugurated the process of this general sort as
long ago as 1970, with a mechanism for review of administrative ac-
62
tion. President Carter introduced a similar process with his Regula-
tory Analysis Review Group, designed "to conduct interagency review
of cost-effectiveness analyses," required for "significant" rules.3 But
the decisive step came under President Reagan, with the formal crea-
57 For evidence, see ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA (Richard D. Morgenstern ed.,
1997).
58 For a discussion of the role of economic analysis in spurring regulation of lead
in gasoline and regulation of CFCs, which are destructive of the ozone layer, see James
K. Hammit, Stratospheric Ozone-Depletion, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 57,
at 131; Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note
57, at 49; and see also the discussion of prompt letters infra Part II.B.
59 See Richard D. Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs,
Implications, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 57, at 458 tbl.1 (providing a
number of examples of "rule improvements associated with economic analysis").
60 For examples of Congress's interest in cost-benefit analysis, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 1532,
1535 (Supp. 11 1996); for examples of the same interest within the executive branch,
see supra note 2, which cites presidential directives on cost-benefit requirements.
61 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 38, at 39-44 ("[T]he interest in cost-benefit balancing
began not through interest in the technique itself, but through efforts to assert greater
presidential control over administration and regulation.").
62 See RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE PLOT THAT FAILED: NIXON AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 45-49 (1975) (discussing the "working group," a Nixon
administration attempt to control bureaucracy through the use of the White House
staIM.
63 Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 14 (1995).
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tion of a mechanism for OMB review of major regulations.
The most important innovations in President Reagan's Executive
Order 12,291 were: (1) a set of substantive principles for all agencies
to follow, "to the extent permitted by law," including a commitment to
cost-benefit analysis; (2) a requirement that a Regulatory Impact
Analysis, including cost-benefit analysis, accompany all "major" rules;
and (3) a formal mechanism for OMB oversight, with a general un-
derstanding that OMB had some (undefined) substantive control over
64what agencies would actually do. President Reagan considered sub-
jecting the independent agencies to the new order, but ultimately de-
clined to do so, partly because of concerns about legal authority, but
mostly because of fears of an adverse congressional reaction. 5 The
independent agencies were asked voluntarily to comply with Executive
Order 12,291; all of them declined.
66
Executive Order 12,291 proved extremely controversial. None-
theless, President Reagan expanded on the basic idea four years later
67with Executive Order 12,498. That order established a requirement
that agencies submit "annual regulatory plans" to OMB for review.
The result was an annual publication, the Regulatory Program of the
United States Government, which contains a discussion of all proposed
actions that might be either costly or controversial. Executive Order
12,498 served to increase the authority of agency heads over their
staffs, by exposing proposals to top-level review at an early stage. But it
also increased the authority of OMB, by allowing OMB supervision
over basic plans, and by making it hard for agencies to proceed with-
out OMB preclearance.
Under President George Bush, the principal innovation was the
Council on Competitiveness, chaired by the Vice President.6s The
64 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
65 See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER:
CASES AND MATERIALS 355-59 (1988) (reprinting a memorandum from Larry L. Simms,
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, to Honorable David
Stockman, Director, Office of Management and Budget (Feb. 12, 1981), describing
and questioning the use of the presidential supervisory power).
See, e.g., THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, RATIONALIZING REGULATION (1990).
67 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986).
68 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY PROGRAM OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, APR. 1, 1990-MAR. 31, 1991, at 5 (1991) (discussing the
Council's role in the regulatory review process). Another very different innovation
that occurred under the first President Bush was the active promotion of market-based
approaches for protecting the environment-the most notable example being the acid
rain allowance trading program, which was the crown jewel of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990. For an evaluation of this trading program, see ELLERMAN ET AL.,
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Council engaged in occasional review of agency rules, operating as a
kind of supervisor of OMB itself. It also set out a number of principles
and proposals for regulatory reform. 9 In essence, however, the Bush
administration followed the basic approach of its predecessor, with
OMB review remaining under the two Reagan executive orders.
Cost-benefit balancing had been highly controversial when con-
ducted by Republican administrations. For this reason, it was uncer-
tain whether President Clinton would allow it to continue to play a
role within the executive branch. But in a significant and dramatic
step, President Clinton endorsed the essential features of the Reagan-
Bush orders in his Executive Order 12,866.'o The crucial point about
Clinton's order is that it accepted the basic commitments of the two
Reagan-Bush orders, by requiring agencies to assess both costs and
benefits and to proceed only when the latter justified the former. At
the same time, President Clinton offered several changes to the
Reagan-Bush processes, mainly attempting to create assurances against
the fear of industry capture of the system of review. First, he at-
tempted to diminish public concerns about interest-group power over
regulation, by providing a process to resolve conflicts and procedures
for greater openness." Second, he included references to "equity," to
"distributive impacts," and to qualitative as well as quantitative factors,
evidently so as to ensure that agencies could make adjustments in the
process of decision, and abandon the cost-benefit assessment where
this seems sensible. 72 Third, President Clinton moved, in a modest but
important way, toward including independent agencies within the ex-
ecutive orders. He did so by requiring the participation of the inde-
pendent agencies within the unified regulatory agenda73 and also by
requiring independent agencies to submit their proposals for inclu-
sion within the annual regulatory plan, allowing the Vice President an
opportunity to advise and consult.4 We will build on these initiatives
here.
Congress has been slower to support efforts to require the balanc-
supra note 20, at 314-16.
69 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 68, at 5.
70 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994).
71 See id. at 648 (providing process for resolution of conflicts between agencies,
including a requirement for publication of any communication with nongovernment
employees).
Id. at 639-40.
73 Id. at 642.
74 Id. at 642-43.
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ing of benefits and costs of major regulations. Two primary environ-
mental statutes that allowed the balancing of benefits and costs prior
to the mid-1990s are the Toxic Substances Control Act 5 and the Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 76 Recently, Congress
has shown greater interest in emphasizing the balancing of benefits
and costs. Table 2 reviews recent regulatory reform initiatives, which
could help improve regulation. The Table suggests that Congress now
shares the concern of the executive branch that the regulatory system
is in need of repair and could benefit from more in the way of eco-
nomic analysis." All reforms highlighted in the Table emphasize a
trend toward considering the benefits and costs of regulation, al-
though the effectiveness of the provisions remains unclear. Perhaps
because of the politicized nature of the debate over regulatory reform,
these reform efforts have come about in a piecemeal fashion, and
78there is some overlap in the requirements for analysis.
75 See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (1994) (describing an allowed balancing of "risk of in-
jury to health or the environment" with "the reasonably ascertainable economic conse-
quences of the rule").
76 See7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994) (allowing regulation to prevent unreasonable adverse
effects on the environment while admonishing the administrator to consider various
economic factors before promulgating regulations).
See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 27, at 3 (noting that "recent legislative debates
have masked a broad consensus among knowledgeable observers on the need for regu-
latory reform").
8 There has been some recent interest in Congress in reducing this overlap by
establishing a single congressional agency that would have the responsibility for assess-
ing government regulation. This agency would be similar to the Congressional Budget
Office, but it would have responsibility for regulation. In principle, such an agency
could help stimulate better analysis and review of agency rules by providing an addi-
tional source of information. See ROBERT W. HAHN & ROBERT E. LITAN, THE
REGULATORY RIGHT-TO-KNOw ACT AND THE CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS ACT: JOINT TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
U.S. SENATE (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Testimony No. 99-1,
Apr. 1999) (discussing the potential benefits of such an agency), http://www.aei-
brookings.org/publications/testimony/testimony_99_01 .pdf.
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Table 2: Recent Regulatory Reform Initiatives79
Unfunded Requires CBO to estimate the costs of certain laws and also requires
Mandates executive agencies to prepare benefit-cost analyses of new mandates
Reform Act of and to choose the "least costly, most cost-effective, or least burden-
1995 some alternative," with certain exceptions.o
Small Business Requires agencies to submit regulations and supporting analyses to
Regulatory Congress and the GAO for sixty days before those regulations can
Enforcement become effective; during that time, Congress can void the regulation
Fairness Act of by enacting ajoint resolution of disapproval.8
1996
Appropriations Require OMB to submit assessment of annual costs and benefits of
Acts 1998 & 2000 all existing federal regulatory programs for certain years.
2
Pipeline Safety Requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue a pipeline standard
and Partnership "only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the in-
Act of 1995 tended standard *ustify its costs." 3
Food Quality Partially repeals the Delaney Clause, which required a zero tolerance
Protection Act level for carcinogens from residues in processed foods, calls instead
of 1996 for "a reasonable certainty of no harm" from pesticide residues and
allows EPA to consider the benefits of a pesticide in granting a toler-
ance.
Safe Drinking Requires the EPA Administrator to "publish a determination as to
Water Act whether the benefits of the maximum contaminant level justify, or
Amendments of do notjustify, the costs."m
1996
Truth in Establishes a three-year pilot program under which individual agency
Regulating Act of Regulatory Impact Analyses are subject to independent evaluation by
2000 GAO, upon request by Congress.'
Biennial Review Requires Federal Communications Commission: (1) to review bien-
Provision of the nially its regulations pertaining to telecommunications service pro-
Telecommunica- viders and broadcast ownership; and (2) to determine whether eco-
tions Act of 1996 nomic competition has made those regulations no longer necessary
in the public interest."7
79 See CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 27, at 10-11 (1997) (noting, in a table, signifi-
cant regulatory reform initiatives); Robert W. Hahn, The Impact of Economics on Envi-
ronmental Policy, 39J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 375, 386-89 (2000) (compiling regulatory
reform initiatives in table form with accompanying textual elaboration).
80 2 U.S.C. § 1535(a), (b) (2000).
81 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2000).
82 Appropriations, 2000-Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, and General Government, Pub. L. No. 106-58, § 628(a), 113 Stat. 430, 472-73;
Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-61,
§625(a), 111 Stat. 1272, 1314-15.
83 49 U.S.C. § 60102(b) (5) (Supp. V 1999).
84 21 U.S.C. § 346a(a) (2) (A) (ii) (Supp. V 1999).
85 42 U.S.C. § 300g-I (b) (4) (C) (2000); see also Hahn, supra note 79, at 387 (noting
the requirement that the administrator must set the contaminant levels to minimize
the overall risk of adverse health effects through a balance of "risk from the contami-
nant and the risk from other contaminants in such cases").
Pub. L. No. 106-312, 114 Stat. 1248 (2000).
87 47 U.S.C. § 161 (Supp. V 1999).
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Courts, too, have shown interest in cost-benefit principles, devel-
oping a set of default rules that authorize agencies to minimize costs
and maximize benefits, in the face of statutory ambiguity. Consider
the following principles,"" all with support in the cases. Unless Con-
gress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to make de
minimis exceptions to statutory requirements by exempting small risks
from regulatory controls.89 Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise,
agencies will be permitted to balance the health risks created by regu-• 90
lation against the health benefits created by regulation. Unless Con-
gress has clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to take costs
into account in issuing regulations. In its current form, this principle
means that where statutes are ambiguous, agencies will have the
authority to consider costs as well as benefits. 9 Unless Congress has
clearly said otherwise, agencies will be permitted to decline to regulate
past the point where regulation would be economically or technologi-
cally feasible. Unless Congress has clearly said otherwise, agencies
will be expected to balance costs against benefits in issuing regula-
tions.93
These principles give the executive branch a great deal of room to
maneuver because they authorize agencies, when so inclined, to move
regulation in more cost-beneficial directions. We will draw on some of
these principles in the discussion to follow.
FS For a more detailed discussion of these principles, see Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-
Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001).
See, e.g., Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 72 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (noting that, because "[e]valuating environmental effects of major roadbuilding
projects... is a long and arduous process," in deciding whether statutory requirements
have been met, a court cannot expect "perfection").
q This principle appears to underlie American Trucking Associations v. EPA, 175
F.3d 1027, 1052 (1999), which states that the "EPA must consider positive identifiable
effects of a pollutant's presence in the ambient air in formulating air quality criteria."
91 See Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[P]reclusion of cost
consideration requires a rather express congressional direction.").
92 See Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Since
we cannot discern clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost ... the
Administrator may consider those factors.").
93 Competitive Enter. Inst. v. NHTSA, 956 F.2d 321, 327 (D.C Cir. 1992)
(remanding the case to NHTSA to make certain that "[w]hen the government
regulates in a way that prices many of its citizens out of access to large-car safety... the




One of the basic motivations for reforming the regulatory process
is that with sensible reforms, regulators should be able to achieve what
everyone would consider to be better social outcomes at lower cost.
Table 3 provides that motivation by showing the cost per statistical life
saved for a number of final regulations at the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency from 1986 to 1994. We acknowledge that tables of this
kind cannot tell us everything that we need to know about regula-
tion;94 but we believe that enormous disparities of this sort are enough
to create a strong presumption of irrationality and incoherence in
regulation. In our view, no one has suggested a basis for rebutting
that presumption.
94 See Heinzerling, supra note 56, at 1998 (noting that a table calculating the costs
of various regulations per life saved "is both overinclusive and underinclusive").
95 Indeed, Heinzerling's own revised table suggests considerable irrationality and
incoherence. See id. at 2039 tbl.3 (recalculating estimates of the costs of various regula-
tions per life saved). We will not engage Heinzerling's general attack on quantifica-
tion, which we believe to be a useful tool for assessing regulation and ensuring cross-
regulation consistency.
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Table 3: Cost of Selected EPA Regulations
per Statistical Life Saved96
Environmental Protection Agency Regulation Year Net Cost per Discounted
Statistical life (millions
of 2000 dollars annually)
Toxicity characteristics to determine 1990 -9400
hazardous wastes
Underground storage tanks: technical 1988 -400
requirements
Asbestos prohibitions: manufacture, 1989 21
importation, processing and distribution in
commerce (total)
National primary and secondary water regula- 1991 28
tions-Phase II: MCLs for 38 contaminants
Hazardous waste management system-wood 1990 57
preservatives
Sewage sludge use and disposal regulations, 1993 215
40 C.F.R. Part 503
Land disposal restrictions for "third third" 1990 215
scheduled waste
Hazardous waste management system: final 1986 226
solvents and dioxins land disposal restrictions
rule
Prohibition on land disposal of first third of 1988 452
scheduled wastes ("second sixth" proposal)
Land disposal restrictions-Phase II: universal 1994 1030
treatment standards and treatment standards
for organic toxicity, characteristic wastes, and
newly listed wastes
Drinking water regulations, synthetic organic 1992 10,800
chemicals-Phase V
Solid waste disposal facility criteria, 1991 40,700
40 C.F.R. Parts 257 and 258 40,700
There are two key points to note from this Table. First, the cost
per statistical life saved spans an extraordinarily wide range-from $9
billion to over $40 billion. Second, there are ample opportunities to
save more lives at less cost, simply because of these significant differ-
ences in the cost per statistical life saved. Taking advantage of these
opportunities would require reallocating expenditures away from
those regulations that are least cost-effective and toward those regula-
96 See HAHN ET AL., supra note 5, at 16-17 (listing regulations from many agencies
with various related costs and benefits). All values have been adjusted to millions of
2000 dollars annually; rules are ranked in order of decreasing cost-effectiveness. Net
cost-effectiveness values are costs, less cost savings.
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tions that are most cost-effective. 97 The consensus among those who
study this area is that there is great potential to develop regulations
that achieve social objectives at lower cost because of the differences
in cost-effectiveness among regulations aimed at achieving the same
(or similar) objectives. Note that OIRA appears to agree, having
urged a number of new initiatives via the new institution of the
prompt letter," taken up below. 9s
Unfortunately, no institution in the federal government now has,
as its primary aim, the goal of targeting regulatory expenditures to
their best uses.99 Instead, the primary instrument used to review the
effectiveness of federal regulations is the regulatory oversight required
by the executive orders discussed above. For the most part, this over-
sight occurs on a regulation-by-regulation basis. 00 OMB's job consists
of meeting with officials and reviewing each Regulatory Impact Analy-
sis (RIA) that is prepared for economically significant regulations.' 1
Each RIA provides a rich source of data for examining the costs and
benefits of regulation as well as the cost-effectiveness of selected regu-
97 There is a long literature on this subject. For analysis by one of the first to make
this point, see John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, REGULATION, Nov./Dec. 1986,
at 86. For subsequent efforts, see, for example, Indur M. Goklany, Rationing Health
Care While Writing Blank Checks for Environmental Hazards, REGULATION, Summer 1992,
at 14; Robert W. Hahn, Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government's Numbers Tell Us?, in
RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED, supra note 17, at 208; Randall Lutter &John F. Morrall
III, Health and Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 43 (1994); and Tengs & Graham, supra note 17. For a critique of
this approach, and of Morrall's in particular, see Heinzerling, supra note 56.
See infra Part II.B (describing prompts and returns).
Justice Breyer makes this point and suggests "establishment of a new career path
that would provide a group of civil servants with experience in health and environ-
mental agencies, Congress, and OMB." BREYER, supra note 7, at 59-60.
100 Executive Order 12,866 does direct the Vice President to conduct a yearly
meeting with agency heads "to seek a common understanding of priorities and to co-
ordinate regulatory efforts to be accomplished in the upcoming year." 3 C.F.R. 638,
642 (1994). Each agency is also required to submit to OMB: a unified regulatory
agenda, which describes all regulations under development or review; a regulatory
plan, which describes "the most important significant regulatory actions that the
agency reasonably expects to issue in proposed or final form in that fiscal year or
thereafter." Id.
101 The executive orders require that the RIA be prepared. Agencies generally do
such a regulatory analysis for each economically significant rule whose annual impact
on the economy exceeds $100 million. Typically, the agency proposing the regulation
performs the regulatory impact analysis, often with the help of outside consultants.
The analysis is supposed to include a statement of the potential need for the proposal,
an examination of alternative approaches, an assessment of benefits and costs, the ra-
tionale for choosing the proposed regulatory action, and a statement of statutory
authority.
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lations.
How has the process worked in practice? Our basic answer,
documented below, is that the process has not worked extremely well.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of federal ex-
ecutive regulatory oversight and the executive orders themselves. The
basic problem is that we have very few natural experiments that pro-
vide useful information. One of the present authors used a data set
and found that the introduction of OIRA did not appear to affect the
cost-effectiveness of regulations, contrary to his hypothesis.1 2 He is re-
luctant to conclude, however, that OIRA does not have an effect.10 3
Farrow used a similar data set, but included regulations that are re-
jected as well as those that are finalized. He found that the cost-
effectiveness of a rule does not have a large impact on the decision to
reject or accept that rule.10 4 Farrow argued that this provides evidence
that OIRA has not had an impact, at least as measured in terms of im-
provements in cost-effectiveness for those rules that are accepted. 10 5
Eric Posner reaches similar conclusions, urging that cost-benefit re-
view is less a tool for improving regulation than for increasing presi-
dential control over agencies.'0 6
Another way of gauging the effectiveness of regulatory oversight is
to measure the quality of each RIA itself. The information provided
in an RIA is often badly incomplete, and the level of detail and ana-
lytical sophistication varies across agencies and types of regulations. 107
102 See ROBERT HAHN, REVIVING REGULATORY REFORM 52 (2000) (noting that "con-
trary to ... expectations, the OIRA variable is not significant" in his study and postulat-
ing reasons why it was not).
103 One problem with the data is that they do not directly measure any impact that
OIRA might have had on changing the cost-effectiveness of particular regulations,
which is one of OIRA's important functions. Hahn explains that the insignificance of
OIRA's effect on cost-effectiveness may be due to a lack of data in the pre-OIRA pe-
riod; the fact that few rules were proposed or finalized following OIRA's creation; and
the methodological problem of measuring OIRA's effect on unobservable, but impor-
tant factors, like other bureaucrats' treatment of potential regulations. Id.
104 Farrow finds that (the logarithm of) cost-per-life saved is significant but that "it
may not be policy significant as cost per life saved must increase by very large amounts
in order to change the probability of rejection by a large factor." FARROW, supra note
15, at 22.
105 Farrow finds that "[tihe suggested impact of OIRA is either not to change or to
increase the estimated cost-per-life-saved between the proposed and final rule," and
that in general, OIRA does not impact cost-effectiveness. Id. at 23.See Posner, supra note 4, at 1142-63 (showing how use of cost-benefit analysis
leads to desirable outcomes from the President's perspective).
107 See Hahn, supra note 97, at 212-14 (describing the discrepancies in RIAs across
agencies); Morgenstern & Landy, supra note 59, at 455, 461-62 (noting variations in the
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In some cases the most basic information, about both benefits and
costs, is missing. Common deficiencies include inadequate considera-
tion of alternatives, poor treatment of uncertainty, incomplete estima-
tion of benefits and costs, as well as various methodological errors. 108
Moreover, different assumptions are applied across regulations." In-
deed, comprehensive analyses of the RIAs suggest that they lack ana-
lytical consistency and that agencies only superficially comply with the
requirements in the Reagan and Clinton executive orders. A study of
forty-eight major health, safety, and environmental regulations from
mid-1996 to mid-1999 provided evidence that agencies generally failed
to comply with the executive order and adhere to the 0MB guide-
lines.' °
From an evaluation of the record on executive regulatory over-
sight, we conclude that the commitment to cost-benefit analysis is as
much symbolic as real. There is not strong evidence that the execu-
tive orders or the oversight process has made a substantial difference
in policy outcomes. Moreover, there is evidence that the cost-benefit
analyses included as part of the regulatory oversight process suffer
from serious flaws.
costs of preparing RIAs across agencies).
108 Agencies do not always indicate the year in which specified benefits and costs
apply. Agencies may show such information only in particular years instead of present-
ing full streams of benefits and costs. Perhaps most importantly, in many cases the
agency did not complete its quantitative analysis of benefits or cost savings. See Hahn,
supra note 97, at 212-14 (illustrating this fact through a number of examples).
109 For an analysis of the sensitivity of net benefit calculations to discount rate and
benefit valuation assumptions, see id.; and see also Matthew Adler & Eric Posner, Im-
plementing Cost Benefit Analysis Wen Preferences Are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
269, 310 (Matthew Adler & Eric Posner eds., 2001), which lists valuations of life given
by various administrative agencies. Agency practices are variable with respect to the
discount rate, id. at 311, and these variations can create significant differences in oth-
erwise similar rules. Some of the variations are extremely hard to defend.
110 See Hahn et al., supra note 4, at 865-76. In a comprehensive evaluation of a de-
tailed data set, the authors found that agencies' economic analyses typically do not
provide enough information to make decisions that will maximize the efficiency or ef-
fectiveness of a rule. For a majority of the rules, agencies failed to quantify net bene-
fits, discuss alternatives, or quantify costs and benefits of alternatives. Id. at 877-79.
On discount rates, see Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount
Rates Used in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1333 (1998).
For OMB guidelines, which comprise a set of principles for improving regulatory
analysis and making the regulatory process more transparent, see OFFICE OF MGMT. &
BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, GUIDELINES TO STANDARDIZE
MEASURES OF COSTS AND BENEFITS AND THE FORMAT OF ACCOUNTING STATEMENTS
(2000), http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/mOO-08.pdf.
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II. PROPOSED INNOVATIONS
The major goal of our proposed executive order is to deepen and
widen the commitment to cost-benefit analysis. We propose to
strengthen the role of OIRA, to offer stricter and clearer principles
and requirements, and to ensure a more transparent, coherent, and
uniform process at the agency level. We also propose to include the
independent agencies within the process of OIRA review. As we shall
emphasize, an executive order, by itself, will not do a great deal to
change the system of regulation. As suggested by the record of the
last two decades, everything depends on matters of implementation.
But a new order would itself be a strong signal of a new commitment
both to cost-benefit balancing and to OIRA; and the suggested innova-
tions would, we believe, hold out considerable promise for improving
the situation.
A. Promoting Compliance
We have seen that the track record on compliance with regulatory
oversight requirements is much less than stellar.' There is no simple
solution to the compliance problem. Political will on the part of high-
level officials is a key component, but even with political will, agencies
might be able to act strategically and game the system.
Keeping these points in mind, we offer two suggestions for com-
pliance: First, OMB should issue a modified set of guidelines on how
to perform the analysis that is required in the RIA and on how to
evaluate that analysis before it is submitted to OMB. If these guide-
lines are not met, then the proposed regulation should be returned to
the agency until the analysis meets the OMB's guidelines. Second, for
important regulations, OIRA should work with the agency to agree on
a set of key assumptions and alternatives to be used in the analysis." 2
If the terms of this agreement are violated, then OIRA can elect to re-
See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGULATORY REFORM: AGENCIES COULD
IMPROVE DEVELOPMENT, DOCUMENTATION, AND CLARITY OF REGULATORY ECONOMIC
ANALYSES 3 (1998) (reporting that a significant number of agencies' economic analyses
"did not incorporate the best practices set forth in OMB's guidance"), http://
www.gao.gov/archive/1998/rc98142.pdf. For a comparison of state and federal regu-
latory oversight initiatives, see Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory Reform: A
Comparative Analysis, 29J. LEGAL STUD. 873 (2000).
2 For a discussion of the benefits and drawbacks of early OMB review of regula-
tory initiatives, see Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review
ofAgency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075,1080-88 (1986).
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turn the proposed regulation to the agency." 3 In our approach, the
guidelines would have a far more prominent place than they now do.
For this reason, we think that the guidelines should be subject to pub-
lic review and comment before they are finalized. The ordinary proc-
ess, for notice and comment via the Federal Register, should suffice
here, as it does elsewhere.1
4
In terms of substance, the most recent guidelines issued by OMB
represent a good start, but we would go further."5 Specifically, the fol-
lowing steps would increase transparency in the regulatory process
and improve the quality of regulatory analysis. With the exception of
the last step, we have not listed them in the executive order itself, on
the theory that they are too specific and detailed to belong there. We
believe, however, that OMB should require such steps:
1. Agencies should post each regulatory impact analysis and sup-
porting documents on the Internet before a draft proposed or final
regulation can be considered in the regulatory review process.
11 See Richard B. Belzer, Comments on Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulation 13 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author). Belzer notes that agencies' "[r]egulatory impact analyses fall short in part be-
cause OMB's oversight occurs too late to secure timely methodological corrections."
Id. at 14. Belzer suggests that before work on an RIA begins, agencies should be re-
quired to consult with the OMB and to agree upon the key assumptions, parameters,
and components of the analysis. He suggests that the protocol that is developed
should be subject to public comment and review. Id. at 14-15. He does not, however,
suggest an enforcement mechanism. One possibility would be for OMB to return a
rule if the terms of the agreement are not met. We think this approach should be tried
on an experimental basis at first. We are concerned with, among other things, how
new knowledge could be incorporated into the decision-making process, see, e.g., Sun-
stein, supra note 41 (manuscript at 13-14, 22-23).
114 There are some legal issues here that we will not address in detail. OMB ap-
pears to lack the statutory authority to make rules and regulations governing federal
regulation. On the other hand, the President has the standard authority, via executive
order, to issue binding principles. For a general discussion, see Elena Kagan, Presiden-
tial Administration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2319-31 (2001). If the President has that
authority, he also has the authority to delegate that power to the director of OMB, at
least if he does so expressly via executive order.
115 For the most recent OMB guidelines, see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra
note 110. In OMB's draft review on benefits and costs in 1998, several other possible
reforms are discussed, including a proposal to ensure that agencies obtain independ-
ent, external peer review of regulatory analyses "in order to identify areas that need
improvement and stimulate the development of better estimation techniques more
useful for assessing existing regulations." Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and
Benefits of Federal Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 44,033 (Aug. 17, 1998). This is probably
a good idea if the peer reviewers are chosen independently and are motivated to spend
the time to do a good job. For some of the problems with peer review, see Linda R.
Cohen & Robert W. Hahn, A Solution to Concerns over Public Access to Scientific Data, 285
SCIENCE 535, 535 (1999).
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2. Agency analyses should include a clear, brief executive sum-
mary (no more than one page) that contains information on costs,
benefits, and technical information, and that says whether the best es-
timate of quantifiable benefits associated with the regulation is likely
to exceed the best estimate of associated costs, and whether it can be
expected to maximize net benefits."6 A summary of key aspects of the
regulation should be included in a table at the beginning of each
RIA. " 7 Table 4 provides an example of a summary table. This Table
could promote accountability by allowing OMB and other interested
parties to evaluate how well agencies are doing in reporting different
kinds of information.
116 Some discussion of the net benefits of reasonable alternatives should also be
included. The guidelines currenly specify that analyses should "compare the antici-
pated benefits to the corresponding costs" for each option analyzed. OFFICE OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, supra note 110, at 4.
17 For an example of a standardized format that could be used to report and
summarize regulatory information, see Robert W. Hahn, How Changes in the Federal Reg-
ister Can Help Improve Regulatory Accountability, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 927, 951-52 (2000).
The regulatory summaries could provide very useful information to OMB in preparing
its annual report on regulation. Specifically, they would enable OMB to provide some
quantitative analysis of the extent to which various agencies were complying with its
guidelines and doing good RIAs. In addition, they would be a good source of informa-
tion for other parties interested in evaluating the overall impact of federal regulation.
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Table 4
Regulatory Impact Summary
I. BACKGROUND ON RULE AND AGENCY
AGENCY AND DEPARTMENT/OFFICE NAME
CONTACT PERSON TELEPHONE NUMBER
TITLE OF THE RULE
RIN NUMBER DOCKET NUMBER
TYPE OF RULEMAKING TYPE OF RULE
(FINAL/INTERIM/PROPOSED/NOTICE) (REGULATORY/BUDGET IMPACT)
STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE RULE RULEMAKING IMPETUS
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE RULE
II. OVERALL IMPACT
1. Will the rule have an impact on the economy of $100 million or more? [ Yes [ No
2. Best estimate of the present value of quantifiable benefits of the rule. $__
3. Best estimate of the present value of quantifiable costs of the rule.' $__
4. Do the quantifiable benefits exceed the quantifiable costs? C1 Yes 0l No
5. Report the dollar year of costs and benefits.
6. Report the discount rate used in the calculations for costs and benefits.
If more than one discount rate was used in calculations, please explain why.
7. Discuss level of confidence in the benefit-cost estimates and key uncertainties. Include
a range for costs and benefits.
8. Identify benefits or costs that were not quantified.
118 Costs are defined as costs minus cost savings.
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III. COSTS AND BENEFITS
Estimated Incremental Costs
1. Costs and breakdown of quantifiable costs by type.









2. Give a brief description of who will bear the costs.
Estimated Incremental Benefits
1. Benefits and breakdown of quantifiable benefits by type.







2. Give a brief description of who will benefit.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE REGULATION
1. List and briefly describe the alternatives to the rule that were considered and why they were
rejected, including a summary of costs and benefits of those alternatives. If no alternatives
were considered, explain why not.
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3. Agencies should be required to calculate the net benefits of a
regulation based on the best available quantitative information.""
4. Agencies should use some default assumptions for standard pa-
rameters in order to facilitate comparison within and across regula-
tions. For example, OMB should specify a default discount rate along
with a range. Similarly, OMB should specify the value of a quality-
adjusted life year and appropriate ranges along with the value of a sta-
tistical life and ranges." ° We recognize that these values may, with
good reason, differ across different regulations; nonetheless, there is
also merit in having a methodology that is fairly standard. Agencies
should be permitted to use alternative assumptions where they can
provide a good rationale that has a basis in economics."'
5. Each federal regulatory agency should be required to produce
an annual report on the benefits and costs of regulatory activities.
Requiring annual reports would make the regulatory process more
transparent, and could improve estimates of the economic impact of
regulatory activity. In addition, the agency reports would help the
OMB produce its overall assessment of the impact of federal regula-
tion. We add some details below.'
B. Prompts and Returns
Our executive order also gives an explicit place for the idea of
"prompt letters," an innovation introduced in the early months of the
Bush administration. 2 3 To understand this idea, some brief back-
ground is in order.
Throughout its history, OIRA's basic mission has been to stop un-
justified rules, mainly through the use of "return letters," which re-
quire agencies to reconsider their proposals. Yet studies show that
adding some regulations, while removing or improving others, could
9 The OMB guidelines assume that the agencies will calculate net benefits. They
allude to net benefits in discussing the comparison of alternatives in explaining how to
discount. They also say that cost-effectiveness can be used instead of net benefit calcu-
lations when necessary. The guidelines never say, however, that agencies must calcu-
late net benefits. The sample chart provided by OMB in its guidelines, in which agen-
cies would report summary information about a regulation, includes costs and benefits,
but not net benefits. OMB 2000 REPORT CHARTS, supra note 8, at 5, 7, 8, 19-20.
120 These values could change over time as new knowledge accrues.
Agencies should be required to use the standard assumptions, as well, for ease
of comparison across regulations.
122 See Appendix (proposing, in section five, regulatory retrospective and regula-
tory planning based on annual agency reports).
1 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 22.
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save tens of thousands of lives and millions of dollars annually. 124 An
important priority for the future is to redesign existing institutions
and agencies by adding regulations that make sense, while reducing
those that do not. One of our primary concerns is that no institution
in government has yet vindicated the hopes of those who believed that
cost-benefit analysis could be used to help promote better priority-
setting, block senseless rules, and spur agency action when it is justi-
fied.
In 2001, OIRA quietly announced a striking, if overdue, innova-
tion: "prompt letters," designed to encourage agencies to explore new
areas in which regulation might deliver benefits that exceed costs.'
Not only did OIRA announce the use of prompt letters; it also issued
four of them. One of those letters, to the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA), involved mandatory disclosure of transfatty acids in the
Nutrition Facts panel of food. 116 Drawing attention to evidence that
transfatty acids contribute to coronary heart disease (CHD), the letter
noted that a disclosure rule seemed to be supported by the FDA's pre-
liminary analysis, which estimated that, ten years after the effective
date, the rule would prevent 7600 to 17,100 cases of CHD and avert
2500 to 5600 deaths per year. Over a twenty-year period, the FDA es-
timated the benefits of such a rule would range from $25 billion to
$59 billion, while the costs would be $400 million to $850 million.
The prompt letter strongly encouraged the FDA to issue a disclosure
rule or to explain its failure to do so.
The other prompt letter, involving automatic external defibrilla-
tors (AEDs), was sent to the Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration (OSHA), with a firm request that the agency "consider
whether promotion of AEDs should be elevated to a priority." 27 The
letter referred to an editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine,
noting that only 2% to 5% of the 225,000 persons who have sudden
and unexpected cardiac arrest each year outside a hospital are suc-
cessfully resuscitated compared to the 17% to 38% success rates found
with AEDs. The prompt letter observed that "some preliminary cost-
effectiveness calculations" showed that "AEDs in the workplace might
124 See HAHN & LITAN, supra note 13, at 1 (noting the significant potential gains of
regulatory reform).
125 News Release, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, OMB Encourages Lifesaving Actions





prove to be very cost-effective." 2 Indeed AEDs, now mandated on air
carriers by the Department of Transportation, are estimated to save
nine lives per year, at the comparatively low price of $2.4 million in
annual costs. The prompt letter suggested that OSHA should con-
sider following the Department of Transportation's lead. The OIRA
has issued a series of prompt letters since the initial announcement,129
including a letter to the Department of Transportation and the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration regarding frontal offset
crash testing, and a letter to the EPA regarding particulate matter.
In our view, these "prompt letters" are an exceedingly important
development. For far too long, the idea of cost-benefit analysis has
been wrongly associated with dogmatic opposition to regulation. To
be sure, an exploration of costs and benefits often shows that regula-
tion cannot be justified. But cost-benefit analyses can show, and have
shown, that government action is worthwhile-and indeed that gov-
ernment should do more. Such analyses helped encourage policy-
makers to remove lead from gasoline and protect the ozone layer.
3
0
Prompt letters promise to strengthen the hand of policy analysts in the
federal government, ensuring that action will be taken on the basis of
a careful assessment of consequences, rather than in reaction to inter-
est groups or political platitudes.
But why-it might be asked-should prompt letters be made pub-
lic? Shouldn't such letters be part of the informal, behind-the-scenes
consultation that often occurs within the executive branch? This is
not a simple question to answer, but in some ways public disclosure of
prompt letters is a great virtue. Public disclosure promotes transpar-
ency and hence accountability. Equally important, public disclosure
increases the likelihood that OIRA's concerns will be taken seriously.
In the end, agencies remain in charge of their own priorities; but if
OIRA's suggestion is reasonable, public disclosure will give agencies
an additional reason to investigate it with care.
It would be desirable in this regard for independent groups to
play a role in recommending prompt letters. OIRA's own resources
are far too limited to enable it to consider all promising possibilities
on its own.'3 ' Environmental groups, for example, might conduct
128 Id.
129 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 22.
130 See Morgenstern & Landy, supra note 59, at 457-59 (noting examples where
economic analysis influenced rulemaking).
131 See id. at 479 (noting that "resource constraints are part of the explanation" for
the narrowness of options considered by agencies).
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their own analyses to suggest that new steps ought to be taken to con-
trol certain pollutants. Institutions that investigate regulatory issues,
and even individual observers from academia and elsewhere, might be
provided with a forum by which they could suggest a prompt letter
from OIRA. The supporting analysis might be developed privately
and reviewed publicly. Steps of this sort might simultaneously in-
crease the quality of analysis and the level of public participation in
the regulatory process.
In our proposed order, we have also given an explicit place to the
idea of "return letters." As a technical matter, the explicitness is not
required; OIRA has been issuing return letters for many years. But
the practice of returning regulations lay dormant during the last years
of the Clinton administration, 13 2 and there is some value in making the
power explicit, if only to give a clear signal that it should be exercised
in appropriate circumstances.
C. De Minimis Exceptions, Substitute Risks, Equity, and Distribution
We have introduced two new principles, implicit in previous or-
ders but deserving explicit recognition. We have also recast the
treatment of equity and distributional effects.
1. De Minimis Exceptions. In a series of cases, courts have author-
ized agencies to exempt trivial risks from regulation, at least when
Congress has not unambiguously denied agencies that authority.
1 3
This principle is a modem version of an ancient idea: de minimis non
curat lex. In the regulatory context, the principle has special impor-
tance. When risks are trivial, it is not likely to be worthwhile to elimi-
nate them, partly because the effort distracts attention from more se-
rious problems, partly because of the sheer expense of the effort. We
have built the de minimis principle into the executive order, asking
agencies not to deal with trivial problems.
2. Substitute Risks. The last decade has seen increasing attention
devoted to the possibility that risk regulation will produce substitute
risks. It is well known that fuel economy standards for new cars
132 There were no return letters in the last three years of the Clinton administra-
tion. Graham, supra note 32.
133 See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Unless
Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of de
minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of
trivial or no value.").
134 See RISK VERSUS RISK, supra note 19, at 25 (defining the term "risk substitu-
tion").
A NEWEXECUTIVE ORDER
might result in the production of smaller and less safe vehicles; what-
ever the extent of this danger, we think it reasonable for government
to take steps to avoid it. In the context of the EPA's ozone standard, it
was successfully urged that EPA should consider the possibility that
regulation of ground-level ozone could actually increase health risks,
by increasing cataracts and skin cancers. I1 5 Indeed, courts appear to
be creating a new default principle, authorizing agencies to take ac-
count of the substitute risks introduced by regulation. The general
problem is ubiquitous, and agencies should take corrective steps. We
have built into the executive order a specific requirement that agen-
cies attend to the problem.
3. Equity and Distribution. We propose to allow agencies to con-
sider the distributional effects of regulation, and to proceed if an un-
derstanding of those effects justifies a departure from the "bottom
line" produced by cost-benefit calculations. This is a departure from
the Reagan order, which offered no reference to distributive effects. 136
At the same time, we require agencies to offer a detailed explanation
for proceeding if the costs significantly exceed the benefits. This is a
departure from the Clinton order, which provided somewhat vague
references to both "equity" and "distributive impacts."137 To under-
stand these points, some background is in order.
A conventional objection to cost-benefit analysis is that it treats so-
ciety as if it were an individual person, and disregards the fact that a
regulation typically produces both winners and losers. Suppose, for
example, that the costs of stricter controls on particulates are $500
million annually, and that the benefits are $350 million. Does this
mean that the stricter controls are a bad idea? This is not so clear.
Skeptics might urge that we need to know far more about the identity
of the winners and the losers. Does the $500 million cost mean that
corporate profits will decline, so that high-level corporate officials will
have reduced salaries? Does it mean that prices will increase, and if
so, are luxury items involved? Will the $350 million in benefits be en-
joyed mostly by poor people? By children? Of course, a measurement
of benefits in terms of "life years" would automatically extend special
concern to children. Or by people who are elderly and already well
off? Critics of cost-benefit analysis believe that in order to know
whether to proceed, it is crucial not simply to tabulate both costs and
135 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discuss-
ing the risks of varying levels of stratospheric versus tropospheric ozone).
136 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994).
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benefits, but to ask and answer such questions.
Such critics have a point, but there are many complexities here.
In some cases, those who benefit from regulation are the same as
those who must pay for it, and hence questions of this kind need not
arise. The EPA's decision to regulate arsenic in drinking water is a re-
138
cent example. Often, of course, those who gain are not the same as
those who lose. But it is wrong to think, as some people seem to do,
that regulation typically imposes costs on wealthy corporations and de-
livers benefits to those in need-and hence that cost-benefit analysis is
an unfortunate method for blocking desirable redistribution. The ba-
sic reason is that regulation is a crude and often ineffective tool for
redistributing resources.9 If, for example, high costs are imposed on
those who buy automobiles or gasoline, the victims will not be some
abstractions called "corporations." On the contrary, it is highly likely
that the costs will be felt by some combination of consumers (with
price increases being especially hard on the poor), workers who must
face lower wages, and people who are thrown into unemployment.
And when regulation provides benefits, there is no general reason to
think that low-income people will be the beneficiaries. In short, the
incidence of regulatory benefits and burdens is not easy to untangle,
and the burdens are likely to be felt by real people, many of them far
from wealthy. All that can be said for certain is that regulation is most
unlikely to transfer resources from those who are well off to those who
are needy.4 '
Invoking considerations of this kind, some people urge that cost-
benefit analysis should be the exclusive basis for regulation, and that
equity and distributional effects are all too likely to be used as an all-
purpose basis for assistance not to those who are needy, but to power-
138 See Sunstein, supra note 41 (manuscript at 5) (discussing regulation of arsenic,
whose costs and benefits would be faced by the same people).
139 See, e.g., ARROW ET AL., supra note 9, at 6 ("While benefit-cost analysis should
focus primarily on the overall relationship between benefits and costs, a good benefit-
cost analysis will identify important distributional consequences."); A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION To LAW AND ECONOMIcs 7-10, 110-13 (1983) ("[I]t is of-
ten impossible to redistribute income through the choice of legal rules and ... even
when it is possible, redistribution through the government's tax and transfer system
may be cheaper and is likely to be more precise.").
Indeed, regulation that is defended on equitable grounds sometimes turns out,
in practice, to benefit powerful private groups with no special claim to governmental
assistance. SeeJAMES HAMILTON & W. KIP VIscusi, CALCULATING RIsKs 1 (2000) (ex-
amining "risk measures to cost data to derive estimates of Superfund site remediations"
in hazardous waste clean-up projects).
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ful private groups. 14 ' But we do not favor going so far as to bar consid-
eration of distributive effects. We do believe that the idea of "equity"
is too vague to be helpful; but in our view, agencies should be permit-
ted to take account of distributive effects. Certainly they should do so
when the context suggests that the benefits will go to people who are
especially needy, and that the burdens will be imposed on people who
can easily bear them-and also when the burdens would be imposed
on the needy and the benefits enjoyed by those who are already very
well off. Consider, for example, the fact that poor people have been
the disproportionate winners from regulation of air pollution.4 1 Con-
sider also the fact that the burdens of stringent regulation of arsenic
in drinking water are likely to be borne disproportionately by those
who are relatively less well off. 43 Though good data will often be ab-
sent, agencies should consider effects of this sort.
When the costs are far higher than the benefits, however, agencies
should not allow distributive effects to be a kind of all-purpose justifi-
cation for proceeding. Instead they should give a careful analysis of
their approach. We believe that if the costs are grossly disproportion-
ate to the benefits, there should be a strong presumption against regu-
lation, rebuttable only in cases where the distributive argument is
compelling.
D. Requiring Explanation When Benefits Do Not Exceed Costs
We believe that agencies should generally act only when the bene-
fits exceed the costs. To be sure, this is not meant as a rigid require-
141 The argument for cost-benefit analysis alone might be supported by noting that
a uniform number for mortality and morbidity risks already contains a redistributive
element, since it refuses to use a higher figure for wealthy people or a lower one for
poor people--despite the fact that willingness to pay is likely to vary with wealth. Of
course, if willingness to pay does vary, a narrowly defined cost-benefit analysis would
take this into account.
142 See Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, REGULATION,
Spring 2001, at 34, 34 ("Given the overall trend in improvements for certain demo-
graphic groups, it appears that regulation under the Clean Air Act has helped, and not
economically harmed, the 'have nots.'").
143 The arsenic rule provides an interesting case because the problem is often lo-
calized. In such cases, several authors have argued for local standards rather than na-
tional standards. See, e.g., Jason K_ Burnett & Robert W. Hahn, A Costly Benefit,
REGULATION, Fall 2001, at 44, 49 (proposing that allowing states or municipalities to
set their own water standards might be a solution that "yields the highest net benefits
for society"); William A. Niskanen, Arsenic and Old Facts, REGULATION, Fall 2001, at 54,
54 (arguing that since "the benefits of a given standard for arsenic accrue to those who
drink water from a specific... system," a national standard is not the proper solution).
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ment. Agencies should be permitted, in unusual circumstances, to act
even when the numbers do not support their action. But in such
cases, we ask an agency that chooses to proceed with a regulation that
does not pass a cost-benefit test to provide a rationale for doing so. By
"does not pass" a benefit-cost test, we mean that the expected quanti-
fiable costs are likely to exceed the quantifiable expected benefits, be-
fore taking distributional effects and any other relevant factors into
account. Of course there are typically large uncertainties in develop-
ing the relevant estimates, and hence a large number of discretionary
judgments must be made before generating the numbers.'44 We think
that the OIRA administrator should decide when a proposed regula-
tion does not pass a cost-benefit test based on her bestjudgment. The
OIRA administrator should be reasonably confident that the quanti-
fied net benefits of the proposed regulation are negative before re-
quiring a rationale. For example, a margin on the order of ten mil-
lion dollars annually could be set as a minimum threshold.
The agency head should be allowed to consider other relevant fac-
tors in her decision making, including distributional effects. These
factors should be quantified to the extent possible, even if they are not
included in the cost-benefit analysis itself. The purpose of the quanti-
fication is to make the analysis more transparent. We also believe that
factors that cannot easily be quantified should be factored into the
analysis where relevant. In providing the rationale for proceeding, the
agency head has an opportunity (and in our view, a duty) to provide a
well-reasoned analytical justification for the decision reached. Requir-
ing a rationale for proceeding when expected net benefits are nega-
tive will give the regulatory process more legitimacy, and should also
lend legitimacy to the use of cost-benefit analysis as a tool for decision
making.
Suppose, -for example, that a new regulation of a certain air pol-
lutant would have monetized benefits of $250 million, but monetized
costs of $280 million. Suppose, too, that the benefits would come in
the form of reduced illnesses among young people, and also reduced
mortality effects for people who would otherwise have many additional
years. Suppose as well that many of the beneficiaries of the regulation
are poor, and that the costs of the regulation would mainly result in
higher prices for certain products (say, cars and energy). The prob-
lem is not entirely simple, especially because increased energy prices
144 See Sunstein, supra note 41 (manuscript at 15-22) (examining the EPA's esti-
mates and assumptions regarding the costs and benefits of its arsenic regulation).
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hit poor people hardest; but in this admittedly stylized example, an
administrator might well be able to justify a decision to proceed even
though the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits.
E. Make Underlying Analysis Available
There has been a controversy over public access to data used in
regulatory decision making. 45 The controversy arose when the EPA
finalized a regulation on particulate matter in July of 1997 that gave
the agency new authority to regulate a variety of emission sources
ranging from power plants to lawn mowers and barbecues. The regu-
lation, estimated to cost between nine and thirty-seven billion annually
1465in 1990 dollars, was based partly on a study that suggested that re-
ducing emissions of fine particles could lead to substantial reductions
in premature mortality.147 In response to that controversy, Senator
Richard Shelby authored a provision in the 1999 Omnibus Spending
Bill that requires data generated under federal awards at universities
and nonprofit institutions to be available to the public.148 0MB then
developed a policy to implement the Shelby amendment.
4 9
Our recommendation would go further than the Shelby amend-
145 See Cohen & Hahn, supra note 115, at 535 ("The scientific establishment is
deeply concerned over a proposed regulation that would require data to be publicly
available under the Freedom of Information Act."); MICHAEL GOUGH & STEVEN
MILLOY, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC ACCESS TO FEDERALLY FUNDED RESEARCH DATA (Cato
Inst., Policy Analysis Series No. 366, 2000) ("[P]ublic review of [scientific] data and
methodology is crucial for both good science and good public policy."),
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-366es.pdf; Angela Antonelli, Public Access to Research
Data: A Public Comment, The Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage.org/
library/testimony/comment091099.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2002) (noting the impor-
tance of making "available to the public information that is used by the federal gov-
ernment to justify new policies or rules"); Science, Technology and Law Program, The
National Academies, Seeking Access to Research Data in the 21st Century: An Ongoing Dia-
logue Among Interested Parties (2001), at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/stl/
Data_AccessWorkshop.html (noting tension in the federal regulatory process between
the need to provide access to research data underlying decisions and the need to pro-
tect the integrity of the research process).
146 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PARTICULATE
MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS AND PROPOSED
REGIONAL HAZE RULE (1997).
147 SeeJocelyn Kaiser, Showdown over Clean Air Science, 277 SCIENCE 466, 466 (1997)
(stating that a study linking a rise in soot levels to a rise in fatalities partially motivated
new EPA rules to "clamp down on particles").
148 H.R. 4328, 105th Cong. (1998).
149 OMB Circular A-1 10, which would permit requesters to be charged a fee for the
data. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-110 (1999), http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a110/al 10.html.
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ment and would require the development of a new policy by OMB.' 50
As a presumption, all relevant information should be made available
to the public regarding the derivation of the likely benefits and costs
from regulations."' 0MB should address this issue through a policy in
its guidelines to the agency (or in a separate policy statement). The
primary purpose here is to promote transparency in the regulatory
process, so the public and interested parties have better access to in-
formation that forms the basis for decision making. 151
F. Adopt an Annual Regulatory Plan and Retrospective
If OIRA becomes involved in the process only to approve or reject
regulations, it will necessarily have a limited role. It would be highly
desirable to create a process by which OIRA, and cost-benefit analysis,
become relevant at an early stage. President Reagan attempted to
move in this direction with his second executive order, which required
agencies to produce an annual regulatory plan.5 3 President Clinton
imposed similar requirements, though little was done with them in
practice. A special advantage of this approach is that it promises to
increase the authority of agency heads over their staffs, simply by en-
suring that plans will be visible before the stage when they are practi-
cally final.
1 Our recommendation is similar to Hahn and Cohen's recommendation con-
cerning economically significant regulations, see Cohen & Hahn, supra note 115, at 536
(suggesting that access requirements should be limited to economically significant
regulations funded by the federal government), but moves beyond federally funded
projects.
151 We are sensitive to the tradeoffs involved in the production of useful informa-
tion, and, thus, would not require that all information necessarily be provided. For
example, companies should not be required to make public proprietary information
that would compromise their competitive position. In many cases, however, such data
can be presented in a form that does not compromise a particular firm. The matter is
somewhat more complicated for scholars. See LINDA R. COHEN & ROBERT W. HAHN,
SHOULD RESEARCHERS BE REQUIRED TO SHARE DATA USED IN SUPPORTING
REGULATORY DECISIONS? (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Regulatory
Analysis No. 99-1, 1999) (discussing the impact of requiring public access to scientific
data on incentives to produce data and research, and on the quality of research),
http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/reganalyses/reg_ analysis_99O l .pdf.
For very significant decisions, say, involving billions of dollars annually, we
think that interested parties should have access not only to data, but also to the models
that generate key results.
Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323, 323 (1986).
154 See Hahn et al., supra note 4, at 878-79 (suggesting that President Clinton's ad-
ministration did little to reform requirements of RIAs "probably due to a lack of inter-
est and willingness to spend political capital").
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Our proposal in this regard is simple and straightforward. We
would require every agency to produce an account of its planned rules
and to forward that account to OIRA, which would in turn be author-
ized to work with the agency to require compliance with the principles
and requirements of the executive order. By calling for OIRA partici-
pation, we hope to ensure more coordination at an early stage than
was achieved under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton.
It is also important to take steps to ensure that existing regulations
are subject to a process of continuing monitoring and oversight. We
do not require any such steps in the proposed order itself, on the
ground that they are best imposed by OMB in its general oversight
function. But the key points are that prospective analyses of costs and
benefits are often erroneous55 and that unanticipated developments
can make regulations obsolete, too stringent, or insufficiently strin-
gent. 56 In order to assist OMB in its task of proposing an annual re-
port of the costs and benefits of regulation, agencies should generate
numbers reflecting their estimates of the effects of their own most sig-
nificant regulations. In addition, a process should be instituted by
each agency to give a retrospective analysis of some of its most costly
regulations to see what kinds of effects they are having in actual proc-
ess. OIRA might work together with the relevant agencies to identify
the best candidates for review. It could also help in defining appro-
priate methods.
G. Incorporating Independent Agencies
We have urged that the process of OIRA review should be wid-
ened, to include the independent agencies as well as executive agen-
cies and departments. As a matter of policy, the motivation for this
suggestion is straightforward. Independent agencies qualify as such
not because of the substance of what they do, but because Congress
has chosen to limit the President's power to remove their top offi-
cials-saying, in the typical formulation, that removal is acceptable
only for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
'5 7
Many of the most important agencies in government are independent
155 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 53, at 40.
156 For a catalogue of the inadequacies of prospective assessments, see Karkkainen,
supra note 54; and see also Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of Regulatoly Cost
Estimates, 19 J. POLY ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2000), which maintains that cost-benefit
analysis insufficiently anticipates unexpected developments.
57 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (concerning the FTC); 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (1994)
(concerning the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission).
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in this sense, including the Federal Communications Commission, the
Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the
Food and Drug Administration, and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission.
In principle, there is every reason to include independent agen-
cies within the basic structure of an executive order on federal regula-
tion. Indeed, the argument for including such agencies seems no
weaker than the argument for including the conventional executive
agencies. Moreover, as Table 5 shows, many of these agencies do not
routinely quantify the benefits and costs of their proposed regulations,
in part because they are not required to do so. If the goal is to ensure
more rationality in regulation, and to devote resources to areas where
they would do the most good, the independent agencies deserve in-
clusion no less than others. The real question is one of law, not of
policy.
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Table 5: Federal Regulatory Agencies' Efforts to
Catalog Benefit and Cost Information 
1 5
8




0 00 0 00 0 0 00 .







---- --- --- --- E r~
0 - 0 0 2 0E ~~
.c 000 ~ '0
V ~ Vs 'v
HAH,-upa- ot--- ,at62--- .--- - --1 1.~~
2002]
1534 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1489
Does the President have the legal authority to do what we pro-
pose? Though no president has tested the question, both the De-
partment of Justice 15 and the American Bar Association'o have con-
cluded that he does. As a technical matter, the question remains
unresolved. In the key case, Humphrey's Executor v. United States,1 61 the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutional legitimacy of the "inde-
pendent" regulatory agencies, but it did not establish what, in particu-
lar, "independence" meant. Nothing in the Court's opinion resolves
the question of whether the President has supervisory authority over
the independent agencies. As an initial matter, the question is one of
statutory interpretation: What authority has Congress given to the
President?
We have noted that the members of independent agencies may be
removed by the President, not at his will, but only for "inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." 63 What do these terms
mean? There are two possible approaches. On a narrow interpreta-
tion, the President is allowed to discharge independent agency heads
only for grounds entirely unrelated to policy disagreements-in which
case the President may not supervise their policy choices. On this in-
terpretation, the President may discharge people for corruption
("malfeasance in office"), for refusing to do their jobs ("neglect of
duty"), or for more general dereliction in the sense of gross incompe-
tence, chronic lateness, and the like ("inefficiency"). On this inter-
pretation, application of the executive order to the independent
agencies would indeed raise serious statutory questions. A process by
which the President monitors such agencies for corruption and dere-
159 See SHANE & BRUFF, supra note 65, at 355-58 (1988) (determining "that an in-
quiry into congressional intent in enacting statutes delegating rulemaking authority
will usually support the legality of presidential supervision of rulemaking by Executive
Branch agencies").
160 See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in In-
formal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 181 app. at 206 (1986) (providing excerpts to this
effect from a recommendation by the ABA's administrative law section and from a
memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel).
161 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
162 The Court did suggest, in dicta, that there would be a great deal of practical
independence, suggesting that the Federal Trade Commission is "independent of ex-
ecutive authority, except in its selection." Id. at 625 (internal quotation marks and cita-
tion omitted). This idea was followed in Borders v. Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250, 260
(D.D.C. 1981), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1982), which involved President
Reagan's effort to remove a member of the District of Columbia Judicial Nomination
Commission.
163 See, for example, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) and 29 U.S.C. § 661(b) (1994) for use
of this language.
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liction would be one thing; a process by which the President monitors
such agencies for what he considers to be sound policy choices would
be quite another.
On the other hand, a broader interpretation of the statutory terms
would hardly be impossible as a textual matter. The first point is that
the narrow interpretation has the disadvantage of raising some unre-
solved constitutional problems. While the Court has upheld the idea
164of independent regulatory commissions, it has never held that Con-
gress can entirely immunize such commissions from presidential over-
sight. To those who are skeptical of agency independence as a consti-
tutional matter, the narrow interpretation would be extremely
troubling and should be avoided if at all possible, so as to avoid a seri-
ous constitutional problem. The second point is that the relevant text
is susceptible of a broader understanding. What counts as "ineffi-
ciency"? What counts as "neglect of duty"? At a minimum, it seems
sensible to say that the President is entitled to require the production
of documents to ensure that agency officials are acting efficiently and
in a way that does not show neglect. 16 To this extent, procedural incor-
poration of the independent agencies-to require them to assess both
costs and benefits-seems to be on firm ground. And it would be rea-
sonable to go further. If agencies proceed when the benefits do not
exceed the costs, they might reasonably be thought to be acting "inef-
ficiently" (pun intended), and in a way that shows a neglect of duty, at
least if the decision to proceed is not adequately explained. A broader
interpretation does not much stretch the language.
None of this suggests that the President, or OIRA, should be per-
mitted to displace the decisions of the independent regulatory agen-
cies. But it does suggest that a supervisory role, leaving the ultimate
decision to those agencies, would be entirely acceptable. To those
who are skeptical of this conclusion, it might make sense to create a
special, weaker system of oversight for the independent agencies, lim-
ited to procedural matters (and hence allowing no room for return
letters). But we think that it would be desirable to keep a single sys-
tem in place for all agencies, retaining the idea that if an independent
I See Humphrey's Executor, 295 U.S. at 631-32 (rejecting a presidential removal of a
member of the Frc); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410-12 & nn.32-35
(1989) (discussing the textual requirements of Article III and their relation to the re-
moval provision at issue in Humphrey's Executor).165
This point also follows from the Constitution's Opinions in Writing Clause. See
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2 ("[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to
the Duties of their respective Offices .. ").
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agency ultimately seeks to issue a regulation notwithstanding OIRA
166
objection, it is entitled to do so.
If our argument seems far-fetched, consider Bowsher v. Synar."' In
Bowsher, the Court struck down Congress's effort to delegate discre-
tionary authority to the Comptroller General.i 8  In so doing, the
Court held that the Comptroller was unduly subject to congressional
control, and thus operated as an agent of Congress, rather than as a
genuinely independent agency.169 But what made the Comptroller an
agent of Congress? The answer is the governing statute, which allows
Congress to discharge the Comptroller for "'inefficiency,"' "'neglect of
duty,"' or "'malfeasance."' 170 But on the narrow view, outlined above,
these terms do not allow Congress much in the way of authority over
the Comptroller. Rejecting the narrow view, the Court described
these terms as "very broad" and suggested that they meant that Con-
gress "in effect ... retained control over the execution of the 
Act., 1 71
In the Court's view, these "very broad [terms] . . .could sustain re-
moval of a comptroller general for any number of actual or perceived
transgressions of the legislative will."
172
It would be easy, even natural to take the Bowsher Court's interpre-
tation of the terms governing congressional removal of the Comptrol-
ler General as authority for the proper interpretation of the terms
governing presidential removal of the members of independent regu-
latory commissions. This is so for a simple reason: the terms are very
close, indeed essentially identical. If the interpretation in Bowsher is to
apply here, then the President's authority is also "very broad" and
"could sustain removal" for a large number of actual or perceived
transgressions of the presidential will. And if this is correct, then the
President does, in fact, have a high degree of authority over the policy
choices of the independent agencies. And if this is correct, then in-
clusion of the independent agencies within the executive order is
plainly lawful, simply as a statutory matter.
We do not contend that this argument is obviously correct. Be-
166We are bracketing here the complex question of when and whether the Presi-
dent can ever "block" an agency head's decision. For a good treatment of this issue,
see Kagan, supra note 114, at 2328-31.
167 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
168 Id. at 734.
169 Id. at 727-32.
170 Id. at 729 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 703(e) (1) (B) (ii)-(iv) (1994)).
171 Id. at 734.
172 Id. at 729.
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cause the statutory language appears in different contexts, it would be
possible to understand the terms in the Comptroller General Act dif-
ferently from the terms limiting presidential power over the inde-
pendent regulatory agencies. Our argument would obviously be
strengthened if, as we believe, constitutional objections to the genuine
"independence" of certain agencies militate against the narrow read-
ing, which would, compared to our reading, restrict presidential con-
trol of the agencies. 173 In light of this background constitutional con-
cern, the authority of Bowsher, and the ambiguity of the statutory text,
we believe that incorporation of the independent agencies would be
lawful-a conclusion, we reiterate, 74 that has been firmly supported by
both the Department ofJustice and the American Bar Association.
H. Judicial Review
Under Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton, executive orders on
federal regulation were solely for the internal management of the ex-
ecutive branch, and they created no rights for judicial enforcement.
7
1
If, for example, an agency's regulatory analysis showed that the bene-
fits did not justify the costs, courts were not permitted to consider that
fact on judicial review. To be sure, some statutes require attention to
both costs and benefits, and when this is so, the agency's analysis of
those factors can be challenged as arbitrary. But the process of analy-
sis under the executive orders, and any disagreements within the ex-
ecutive branch, would not be topics forjudicial consideration.
It is not difficult to understand why the executive branch would be
skeptical of the idea of judicial intervention. As a general rule, it is
not in the interest of the executive branch to increase the authority of
the judiciary over executive officers. To be sure, judicial review might
solve an agency problem faced by the President if courts could be en-
listed to enforce presidential prerogatives against agencies. But the
apparent judgment of the executive branch has been that the risks of
that course, prominently including losses on appeal, outweigh the ad-
vantages.
173 See Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 106-08 (1994) (analyzing the constitutional concerns raised by an
agency with "complete independence from the President").
'7 Supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
175 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,112, 3 C.F.R. 159, 162 (2001) ("This order is in-
tended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not
intended to create any right, benefit, or trust responsibility, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or equity... against the United States .... ").
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We have suggested a modest but significant change, slightly com-
promising the interests of the Executive in favor of the interests of the
public as a whole. Under our order, judicial review of the materials
generated pursuant to the order would be available, but only to the
extent that those materials are relevant to the agency's decision under
the relevant statute. This proposal would not violate current law; it
would merely add to the set of materials that courts examine when
testing the question of whether the agency has followed the statute or
acted arbitrarily. To be sure, this innovation would add materials to
the file for judicial review, and in that sense would complicate the ju-
dicial task. But it would add little beyond what courts are now consid-
ering in the regulatory context.
176
III. WHAT EXECUTIVE ORDERS CAN AND CANNOT Do:
A CAUTIONARY NOTE
We believe that a new executive order on federal regulation could
do a great deal of good. One reason is the very signal that such an or-
der would send: By virtue of its high visibility, and because of its
source (the White House), a new order would suggest a serious com-
mitment, on the part of high-level officials, to improving regulatory
outcomes. Another reason is that such an order could embody insti-
tutional and substantive reforms that would reduce the problems of
shallowness and narrowness. Our central goal has been to ensure that
the commitments in previous executive orders are real rather than
symbolic, and we believe that the steps suggested here would be help-
ful in promoting that goal.
An executive order is not, however, a panacea; it is not sufficient
for real change, and for some purposes it is not even necessary. With
respect to the question of necessity, we have noted that OIRA could
move in many of the directions we propose under existing law, includ-
ing the existing executive order. Indeed, one of our major goals has
been to outline the lessons of over two decades of experience with
presidential requirements of cost-benefit balancing and to suggest
what can be done in response to that experience. If a new executive
order does not seem desirable or feasible, we hope that our discussion
and our proposed order will have heuristic value, suggesting what
176 See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (ruling that chloroform must be treated as a threshold carcinogenic pollutant
that has a level of exposure that poses no risk of cancer under the Safe Drinking Water
Act).
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should be done even without formal changes.'77 With respect to the
insufficiency of a new order, some statutes ban cost-benefit balancing,
and the Executive must obey the law. A thoroughgoing reform effort
would require legislative reforms, not merely executive action. At the
executive level itself, everything depends on implementation. It is
possible that an executive order, like a constitution, will be a mere
"parchment barrier,1 78 with little or no effect on the real world. In
fact, successful implementation probably requires high-level political
support, in the form, for example, of a clear understanding that the
President or the Vice President is committed to the process inaugu-
rated by the executive order. But an executive order would itself be a
step toward establishing that understanding.
To make the process truly effective, however, greater congres-
sional support will probably be required. This support will come only
if the public sees a need for greater transparency and accountability in
the regulatory process. The reality is that most of the public is (usu-
ally rationally) uninformed on many regulatory issues, including the
issue of regulatory oversight. 79 And legislators do not typically have a
strong incentive to support regulatory reforms that promote account-
ability. Indeed, many members of Congress seem to prefer to enact
laws that give the appearance of fixing the problem-leaving it to the
Executive and the judiciary to sort out implementation. Without
stronger congressional efforts, any steps from the President will have a
limited effect.
177 Note in this regard that prompt letters and return letters are being issued in
significant numbers without any formal changes. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, su-
pra note 22 (suggesting issues the OMB considers worthy of agency priority along with
possible ways for an agency to improve its regulations); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
RETURN LETrERS, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2002) (archiving recent return letters that detail the faulty under-
lying analysis of an agency rule or a rule's inconsistency with regulatory principles
stated in executive orders without instituting actual formal change to these rules).
178Jack N. Rakove, Parchment Barriers and the Politics of Rights, in A CULTURE OF
RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW- 791 AND 1991, at
98, 129-36 (MichaelJ. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
179 For the classic discussion of rational ignorance on the part of voters, see
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 214-18 (1957).
180 On the political economy of regulation, see, for example, ROGER G. NOLL,
REFORMING REGULATION (1971); BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE
REGULATION GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1978); and
ROGER G. NOLL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF THE SLOWDOWN IN REGULATORY
REFORM (1999), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/books/
economics-and-politics.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
Government regulation continues to display a pattern of "para-
noia and neglect.".81 Understood as a pragmatic tool for drawing at-
tention to the likely effects of regulation, cost-benefit analysis holds
out considerable promise for overcoming the underlying problems.
For over twenty years, executive orders have attempted to discipline
the administrative process by requiring agencies to pay close attention
to both costs and benefits. But the overall record is mixed. In many
cases, cost-benefit analysis does appear to have improved agency deci-
sions in quite significant ways."" At the same time, the system for
OIRA review has not succeeded in fundamentally redirecting regula-
tion toward areas where it would do the most good.
Of course there are many reasons for this mixed record.18 3 But
part of the reason, we suggest, is that the Executive's commitment to
cost-benefit analysis remains both too shallow and too narrow. It is
too shallow because too much of the time agencies fail to take the
commitment seriously, and the process of OIRA review has not en-
sured that they will do so. It is too narrow because a large number of
agencies are not subject to OIRA review at all. We have suggested a
range of possible responses. To overcome shallowness, we have called
for mandatory compliance with OMB guidelines on regulatory analy-
sis, formalized the ideas of "return letters" and "prompt letters," of-
fered new principles governing substitute risks and trivial risks, clari-
fied the issue of equity and distributional effects, and authorized
limited judicial review of the materials generated through this process.
To overcome narrowness, we have included the independent agen-
cies, which issue many of the nation's most important regulations,
within the scope of the order.
As we have discussed, an executive order, standing by itself, will
not do all, or even nearly all, of what should be done. A great deal
depends on personnel and on a serious commitment, on the part of
high-level officials, to regulatory reform. Congressional support is also
181 John D. Graham, Making Sense of Risk: An Agenda for Congress, in RisKs, COSTS,
AND LivEs SAVED, supra note 17, at 183, 183.
182 See ECONOMIc ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 57 (presenting a series of essays
discussing the role of benefit-cost analysis in EPA's decision making over the last two
decades).
18. One reason, mentioned above, is that Congress sometimes bans cost-benefit
balancing. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (holding
that the Clean Air Act "unambiguously bars cost considerations" when the EPA sets
ambient air quality standards under the Act).
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important. As we have suggested, a great deal could be done under
the existing order; to reduce the reality and appearance of partisan-
ship, there are clear advantages to a situation in which an administra-
tion of one party is operating under principles laid down by an ad-
ministration of another party. But the experience of the last two
decades suggests that a revised and improved executive order could
attract the support of people with a wide range of political commit-
ments, and inaugurate significant improvements in the system of gov-
ernment regulation.
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APPENDIX:
A NEW EXECUTIVE ORDER
The American people deserve a regulatory system that protects and
improves their health, safety, environment, and well-being without
imposing unacceptable or unreasonable costs on society. Cost-benefit
analysis is an indispensable tool for promoting this goal. Regulatory
policies should be based on a careful assessment of the likely conse-
quences of regulation, including an effort to assess and balance both
costs and benefits. Regulatory policies should use the lowest-cost
means of achieving social goals. Public and private resources should
be devoted to large problems, not trivial ones.
The general objective of this Executive Order is to ensure that cost-
benefit analysis, understood as a tool to produce better decisions, will
have a far larger role in the Federal Government than it now does.
The particular objectives are: to ensure that regulations are adopted
on the basis of an evaluation of their likely consequences; to promote
sensible priority-setting; to increase attention to neglected problems
while reducing expenditures on minor or nonexistent problems; to
ensure that agencies consider alternatives to costly regulation; to en-
hance planning and coordination with respect to both new and exist-
ing regulations; and to make the process accessible and open to the
public. In pursuing these objectives, the regulatory process shall be
conducted so as to meet applicable statutory requirements and with
due regard to the discretion that has been entrusted to the Federal
agencies.
Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as President by the Consti-
tution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby or-
dered as follows:
Section 1. Statement of Regulatory Approach and Requirements
(A) Approach. Federal agencies should promulgate only such regula-
tions as are required by law, are necessary to interpret the law, or are
made necessary by compelling public need, such as material failures of
private markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the pub-
lic, the environment, or the well-being of the American people. In
deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies shall assess the costs
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and benefits of reasonable regulatory alternatives, including the alter-
native of not regulating. Costs and benefits shall be understood to in-
clude both quantifiable measures (to the fullest extent that these can
be usefully estimated) and qualitative measures of costs and benefits
that are difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.
Agencies should ordinarily act only if the incremental benefits exceed
the incremental costs. Further, in choosing among alternative regula-
tory approaches, agencies should ordinarily select the approach that
maximizes net benefits, unless a statute requires another regulatory
approach.
(B) Agency Requirements. To ensure that agency regulations are
consistent with the approach set forth above, agencies shall adhere to
the following requirements, to the extent permitted by law:
(1) Each agency shall identify the problem that it intends to ad-
dress as well as assess the significance of that problem.
(2) Each agency shall explain why the problem that it intends to
address is not adequately handled by private markets or by state or lo-
cal authorities.
(3) Each agency shall examine whether existing regulations (or
other law) have created, or contributed to, the problem that a new
regulation is intended to correct and whether those regulations (or
other law) should be modified to achieve the intended goal of regula-
tion more effectively.
(4) Each agency shall identify and assess available alternatives to
direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encour-
age the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or
providing information upon which choices can be made by the public.
(5) In setting regulatory priorities, each agency shall attempt to
ensure that it addresses serious problems rather than trivial ones and
shall consider, to the extent reasonable, the degree and nature of the
risks posed by various substances or activities within its jurisdiction.
(6) Each agency shall explore and explain whether any regulation
will create significant new risks of any kind, and if so, shall identify the
extent of any new risks in qualitative and quantitative terms.
(7) When an agency determines that a regulation is the best avail-
able method of achieving the regulatory objective, it shall design its
regulation in the most cost-effective manner to achieve that objective.
(8) Each agency shall assess both the incremental costs and bene-
fits of the intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and
benefits are uncertain and difficult to quantify, should generally pro-
pose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
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the incremental benefits of the intended regulation exceed its incre-
mental costs. If an agency seeks to proceed even though the quantifi-
able incremental benefits do not exceed the quantifiable incremental
costs, then the agency should explain why it seeks to proceed in those
circumstances, by, for example, referring to distributional effects as
authorized by subsection (15) below.
(9) Each agency shall base its decisions on the best reasonably ob-
tainable scientific, economic, and other information concerning the
need for, and consequences of, the intended regulation.
(10) Each agency shall identify and assess reasonable alternative
forms of regulation, including at least two reasonable alternatives to
the option under consideration, one more stringent and one less
stringent.
(11) Each agency shall, to the extent feasible, use performance ob-
jectives, rather than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance
that regulated entities must adopt.
(12) Wherever feasible, agencies shall seek the views of those most
likely to be affected, including appropriate state, local, and tribal offi-
cials before imposing regulatory requirements that might significantly
or uniquely affect those governmental entities. As appropriate, agen-
cies shall seek to reduce unnecessary conflicts between federal regula-
tory actions and other law and regulation, including that issued by
state and local governments.
(13) Each agency shall avoid regulations that are inconsistent, in-
compatible, or duplicative with/of other regulations or policies.
(14) Each agency shall draft its regulations in language that is
simple and easy to understand.
(15) Each agency shall consider, as appropriate, distributional ef-
fects, and after undertaking the analysis of costs and benefits, agencies
shall be permitted to take account of those distributional effects in de-
ciding whether to proceed. If the costs exceed the benefits by a sub-
stantial margin, agencies shall proceed only if the distributional effects
are very clear and highly desirable.
Section 2. Organization
An efficient regulatory planning and review process is vital to ensure
that the Federal Government's regulatory system best serves the
American people.
(A) The Office of Management and Budget. Coordinated review of
agency rulemaking is necessary to ensure that regulations are consis-
tent with applicable law, the President's priorities, and the principles
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set forth in this Executive Order, and that decisions made by one
agency do not conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned by
another agency. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) shall
carry out that review function. Within OMB, the Office of Informa-
tion and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is the repository of expertise con-
cerning regulatory issues, and should thus take the lead in implement-
ing this Executive Order. Where appropriate, OIRA should draw
heavily on the expertise of the Council of Economic Advisers and the
Office of Science and Technology Policy in developing sound regula-
tory policy. To the extent permitted by law, OMB shall provide guid-
ance to agencies and assist the President, the Vice President, and
other regulatory policy advisors to the President in regulatory plan-
ning, and shall be the entity that reviews individual regulations, as
provided by this Executive Order.
(B) OIRA shall be authorized to review proposed regulations. To
carry out this task, OIRA shall issue guidelines governing regulatory
impact analyses. These guidelines shall be issued after an appropriate
period for comments from affected agencies, the private sector, and
any interested persons. When a proposed regulation does not, in
OIRA's view, conform to the principles set out in this Executive Order
or to OIRA guidelines for engaging in regulatory analysis, OIRA shall
return the regulation to the agency for reconsideration.
(C) OIRA shall be authorized to prompt agencies to undertake ac-
tions where the incremental benefits exceed the incremental costs.
When OIRA has asked an agency to undertake such action, the agency
shall, within 60 days, offer a public account of its intended course of
action.
(D) The Vice President. The Vice President is the principal advisor to
the President on, and shall coordinate the development and presenta-
tion of recommendations concerning, regulatory policy, planning,
and review, as set forth in this Executive Order. In fulfilling their re-
sponsibilities under this Executive Order, the President and the Vice
President shall be assisted by the regulatory policy advisors within the
Executive Office of the President and by such agency officials and per-
sonnel as the President and the Vice President may, from time to time,
consult.
Section 3. Definitions
For purposes of this Executive Order:
(A) "Advisors" refers to regulatory policy advisors consulted by the
President and Vice President, including, among others:
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the Director of OMB;
the Chair (or another member) of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers;
the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy;
the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy;
the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology;
the Assistant to the President for Intergovernmental Affairs;
the Assistant to the President and Staff Secretary;
the Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice Presi-
dent;
the Assistant to the President and Counsel to the President;
the Deputy Assistant to the President and Director of the White
House Office on Environmental Policy; and
the Administrator of OIRA, who also shall coordinate communica-
tions relating to this Executive Order among the agencies, OMB, the
other Advisors, and the Office of the Vice President.
(B) "Agency," unless otherwise indicated, means any authority of the
United States that is an "agency" under 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1), includ-
ing those considered to be independent regulatory agencies, as de-
fined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10).
(C) "Director" means the Director of OMB.
(D) "Regulation" or "rule" means an agency statement of general ap-
plicability and future effect, which the agency intends to have the
force and effect of law, that is designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or to describe the procedure or practice re-
quirements of an agency. It does not, however, include:
(1) Regulations or rules that pertain to a military or foreign affairs
function of the United States, other than procurement regulations
and regulations involving the import or export of nondefense articles
and services;
(2) Regulations or rules that are limited to agency organization,
management, or personnel matters; or
(3) Any other category of regulations exempted by the Adminis-
trator of OIRA.
(E) "Regulatory action" means any substantive action by an agency
(normally published in the Federal Register) that promulgates or is
expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, in-
cluding notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking,
and notices of proposed rulemaking.
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(F) "Significant regulatory action" means any regulatory action that is
likely to result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, the environ-
ment, public health or safety;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an
action taken or planned by another agency; or
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,
user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients
thereof.
Section 4. Centralized Review of Regulations
The guidelines set forth below shall apply to all regulatory actions, for
both new and existing regulations, by agencies other than those agen-
cies specifically exempted by the Administrator of OIRA:
(A) Agency Responsibilities.
(1) Each agency shall (consistent with its own rules, regulations,
or procedures) provide the public with meaningful participation in
the regulatory process. In particular, before issuing a notice of pro-
posed rulemaking, each agency should, where appropriate, seek the
involvement of those who are significantly affected by any regulation.
In addition, each agency should afford the public a meaningful op-
portunity to comment on any proposed regulation, which in most
cases should include a comment period of not less than 60 days.
(2) In addition to adhering to its own rules and procedures and to
the requirements of applicable law, each agency shall develop its regu-
latory actions in a timely fashion and adhere to the following proce-
dures with respect to a regulatory action:
(a) Each agency shall provide OIRA, at such times and in the
manner specified by the Administrator of OIRA, with a list of its
planned regulatory actions, indicating those which the agency believes
are subject to review under this Executive Order. Absent a material
change in the development of the planned regulatory action, those
not designated as significant will not be subject to review under this
section unless, within 10 working days of receipt of the list, the Admin-
istrator of OIRA notifies the agency that OIRA has determined that a
planned regulation is a significant regulatory action within the mean-
ing of this Executive Order. The Administrator of OIRA may waive
review of any planned regulatory action designated by the agency as
significant, in which case the agency need not further comply with
subsection (A) (2) (b) or subsection (A) (2) (c) of this section.
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(b) For each matter identified as, or determined by the Admin-
istrator of OIRA to be, a significant regulatory action, the issuing
agency shall provide to OIRA:
(i) The text of the draft regulatory action, together with a
reasonably detailed description of the need for the regulatory action
and an explanation of how the regulatory action will meet that need.
The description of need should clearly identify whether the regulation
is designed to address a specific failure in the functioning of markets
and how it addresses that need.
(ii) An assessment of the potential costs and benefits of the
regulatory action, including an explanation of the manner in which
the regulatory action is consistent with a statutory mandate and, to the
extent permitted by law, maximizes net economic benefits.
(c) For those matters identified as, or determined by the Ad-
ministrator of OIRA to be, a significant regulatory action within the
scope of section 3(F) (1), the agency shall also provide to OIRA the
following additional information developed as part of the agency's de-
cision-making process (unless prohibited by law):
(i) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of
benefits anticipated from the regulatory action together with, to the
extent feasible, a quantification of those benefits.
(ii) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of
costs anticipated from the regulatory action, together with, to the ex-
tent feasible, a quantification of those costs; and
(iii) An assessment, including the underlying analysis, of
costs and benefits of potentially effective and reasonably feasible al-
ternatives to the planned regulation-including improvements to the
current regulation and viable nonregulatory actions such as informa-
tion provision-and an explanation why the planned regulatory action
is preferable to the identified potential alternatives.
(d) In emergency situations, or when an agency is obligated by
law to act more quickly than normal review procedures allow, the
agency shall notify OIRA as soon as possible and, to the extent practi-
cable, comply with subsections (A) (2) (b) and (c) of this section. For
those regulatory actions that are governed by a statutory or court-
imposed deadline, the agency shall, to the extent practicable, sched-
ule rulemaking proceedings so as to permit sufficient time for OIRA
to conduct its review, as set forth below in subsection (B) (2) through
(4) of this section.
(e) After the regulatory action has been published in the Fed-
eral Register or otherwise issued to the public, the agency shall:
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(i) Make available to the public, via the Internet and
through other appropriate means, the information set forth in subsec-
tions (A) (2) (b) and (A) (2) (c);
(ii) Identify for the public, in a complete, clear, and simple
manner, the substantive changes between the draft submitted to OIRA
for review and the action subsequently announced; and
(iii) Identify for the public those changes in the regulatory
action that were made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA.
(B) OIRA Responsibilities. The Administrator of OIRA shall provide
meaningful guidance and oversight so that each agency's regulatory
actions are consistent with applicable law, the President's priorities,
and the principles set forth in this Executive Order and do not con-
flict with the policies or actions of another agency. OIRA shall, to the
extent permitted by law, adhere to the following guidelines:
(1) OIRA shall review all actions identified by the agency or by
OIRA as significant regulatory actions.
(2) OIRA shall waive review or notify the agency in writing of the
results of its review within the following time periods:
(a) For any notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed
rulemaking, or other preliminary regulatory actions prior to a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, within 10 working days after the date of
submission of the draft action to OIRA;
(b) For all other regulatory actions, within 90 calendar days af-
ter the date of submission of the information required by this Order,
unless OIRA has previously reviewed this information and, since that
review, there has been no material change in the facts and circum-
stances upon which the regulatory action is based, in which case,
OIRA shall complete its review within 60 days; and
(c) The review process may be extended either (i) once by no
more than 30 calendar days upon the written approval of the Director
or (ii) at the request of the agency head.
(3) For each regulatory action that the Administrator of OIRA re-
turns to an agency for further consideration of some or all of its provi-
sions, the Administrator of OIRA shall provide the issuing agency a
written explanation for such return, setting forth the pertinent provi-
sion of this Executive Order on which OIRA is relying.
(4) For each regulatory action for which the Administrator of
OIRA issues a prompt letter, the Administrator of OIRA shall provide
the issuing agency a written explanation for such prompt, setting forth
the pertinent provision of this Executive Order on which OIRA is rely-
ing.
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(5) Except as otherwise provided by law or required by a Court, in
order to ensure greater openness, accessibility, and accountability in
the regulatory review process, OIRA shall be governed by the follow-
ing disclosure requirements:
(a) All substantive communications between OIRA personnel
and persons not employed by the executive branch of the Federal
Government regarding a regulatory action under review shall be gov-
erned by the following guidelines:
(i) A representative from the issuing agency shall be invited
to any meeting between OIRA personnel and such person (s);
(ii) OIRA shall forward to the issuing agency, within 10
working days of receipt of the communication(s), all written commu-
nications, regardless of format, between OIRA personnel and any per-
son who is not employed by the executive branch of the Federal Gov-
ernment, and the dates and names of individuals involved in all
substantive oral communications (including meetings to which an
agency representative was invited, but did not attend, and telephone
conversations between OIRA personnel and any such persons); and
(iii) OIRA shall publicly disclose relevant information about
such communication (s), as set forth below.
(b) OIRA shall maintain a publicly available log that shall con-
tain, at a minimum, the following information pertinent to regulatory
actions under review:
(i) The status of all regulatory actions, including if (and if
so, when and by whom) Vice Presidential and Presidential considera-
tion was requested;
(ii) A notation of all written communications forwarded to
an issuing agency; and
(iii) The dates and names of individuals involved in all sub-
stantive oral communications, including meetings and telephone con-
versations, between OIRA personnel and any person not employed by
the executive branch of the Federal Government, and the subject mat-
ter discussed during such communications.
(c) After the regulatory action has been published in the Fed-
eral Register or otherwise issued to the public, or after the agency has
announced its decision not to publish or issue the regulatory action,
OIRA shall make available to the public all documents exchanged be-
tween OIRA and the agency during the review by OIRA under this sec-
tion. If material is proprietary or otherwise privileged, OIRA shall
make exceptions to ensure appropriate protection.
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Section 5. Regulatory Retrospective and Regulatory Planning
(A) Each agency shall produce an annual report on the benefits and
costs of its significant regulations during the past year. A draft of the
annual report shall be submitted to OIRA to ensure an adequate pe-
riod (in no case less than 90 days) for OIRA review and comment.
(B) Each agency shall produce, by December 31 of each year, a report
on its planned activities for the following year ("annual regulatory
plan"). OIRA shall be given an opportunity to comment on the an-
nual regulatory plan and to work with the relevant agency to ensure
compliance with the requirements and principles in this order.
Section 6. Resolution of Conflicts
To the extent permitted by law, disagreements or conflicts between or
among agency heads, or between OIRA and any agency, that cannot
be resolved by the Administrator of OIRA shall be resolved by the
President, or by the Vice President acting at the request of the Presi-
dent, with the relevant agency head (and, as appropriate, other inter-
ested government officials). Vice Presidential and Presidential con-
sideration of such disagreements may be initiated only by the
Director, by the head of the issuing agency, or by the head of an
agency that has a significant interest in the regulatory action at issue.
Such review will not be undertaken at the request of other persons,
entities, or their agents.
Resolution of such conflicts shall be informed by recommendations
developed by the Vice President, after consultation with the Advisors
(and other executive branch officials or personnel whose responsibili-
ties to the President include the subject matter at issue). The devel-
opment of these recommendations shall be concluded within 60 days
after review has been requested.
At the end of this review process, the President, or the Vice President
acting at the request of the President, shall notify the affected agency
and the Administrator of OIRA of the President's decision with re-
spect to the matter.
Section 7. Publication
Except to the extent required by law, an agency shall not publish in
the Federal Register or otherwise issue to the public any regulatory ac-
tion that is subject to review under section 4 of this Executive Order
until whichever of the following occurs first: (1) the Administrator of
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OIRA notifies the agency that OIRA has waived its review of the action
or has completed its review without any requests for further considera-
tion; or (2) the applicable time period expires without OIRA having
notified the agency that it is returning the regulatory action for fur-
ther consideration. If the terms of the preceding sentence have not
been satisfied and an agency wants to publish or otherwise issue a
regulatory action, the head of that agency may request Presidential
consideration through the Vice President, as provided under section 6
of this Order. Upon receipt of this request, the Vice President shall
notify OIRA and the Advisors. The guidelines and time period set
forth in this Order shall apply to the publication of regulatory actions
for which Presidential consideration has been sought.
Section 8. Judicial Review
This Executive Order is intended to improve the internal manage-
ment of the Federal Government. Agency analyses generated by this
Executive Order shall be placed on file for judicial review and, to the
extent that those analyses are relevant to the legality of the agency's
conduct, the reviewing court may consider them in assessing the legal
issues. This Executive Order does not otherwise create any right or
benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a
party against the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its of-
ficers or employees, or any other person.
